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Thursday, May 19, 2011

Setting the Record Straight

In a recent post, Rabbi Slifkin characterizes my position as follows:

True, in his primary post about evolution, he was forced to concede that theistic evolutionists also legitimately see God's presence in creation, and had to content himself with arguing that they are irrational for seeing direct design in the laws of nature but not in the specific features of the animal kingdom

Although I understand Rabbi Slifkin’s interpretation of my view, ultimately he is not correct. I believe that theistic evolutionists do not see God’s presence in creation. Anyone who is capable of ignoring God’s Hand in the formation of the cell is fooling himself if he thinks he sees God’s Hand in the laws of nature. This is not the time or place to explain my position. I just wanted to set the record straight.

Thursday, May 12, 2011

Books of Heresy

Ami Magazine recently highlighted the story of a ben-Torah who, nebach, lost his emunah. His wife wrote a letter to the magazine documenting the events which led to this unfortunate state of affairs. She writes as follows:

Of course I noticed the telltale signs. I watched with great concern as my kollel husband no longer resembled his peers. I inwardly cringed as books, radio, Internet replaced the Talmud, Chumash, sefarim.

Rabbi Slifkin makes the following comments:

The situation with this husband and wife is, of course, sad. But what I personally find especially painful is how some of this tragedy is so unnecessary and possibly made worse by the wife. Was it such a tragedy that he brought secular books into the home?

Apparently so! First of all, the wife was referring to a general trend of replacing Torah learning with secular books, radio and Internet. Second of all, yes, secular books are eminently capable of dragging a person off the path of emunah! The gemara in Chagiga (15b) relates that the great sage Elisha ben Avuya went off the derech because he was influenced by Greek culture (he was always whistling Greek tunes) and Greek attitudes (books of heresy).

Secular books are, for the most part, anti-Torah; they contain the attitudes of the gentile nations which are diametrically opposed to the attitude of the Torah. Even innocuous books, such as those on science, are tainted with the attitudes of the goyim. It is extremely dangerous for an innocent ben-Torah to start taking unwarranted and unsupervised excursions in the fields of gentile literature. Human beings, all human beings, are extremely impressionable and thus it is a sakana gedolah to allow oneself to be exposed to foreign ideologies. This is the most obvious lesson that can be learned from this Ami article.

(I'll bet she doesn't know that Rav Dessler studied Uncle Tom's Cabin.)

This comment was particularly distasteful to me. Rav Dessler studied secular disciplines under the close supervision of his father and his Rabbeim in yeshiva. Like the aforementioned gemara in Chagiga mentions (regarding learning from one who is tainted by heresy), it is indeed possible to “extract the kernel and discard the chaff” but only under certain circumstances. By no means can it be used as a blanket heter to read secular books indiscriminately; i.e. without any discretion or supervision.

She cried so terribly when he attended a conference on evolution? Goodness, it's not as though it was a conference on Bible criticism or atheism!

It was worse! If an innocent ben-Torah makes the tragic mistake of attending a conference on evolution, it is like attending a conference on Bible criticism and atheism combined! He would have been better off visiting a house of ill repute! Far better. A conference on evolution is populated one hundred percent by atheists, Bible critics, and every other form of human degradation. Everyone there is no doubt an avowed enemy of Hashem and His Torah. Rabbi Slifkin’s comments demonstrate that, unfortunately, he has lost any semblance of sensitivity to the dangers of being influenced by gentile attitudes.

There are many fine, frum, OrthoDOX people who attend conferences on evolution, which is not at all incompatible with Torah.

What an unfortunate attitude. There is nothing more incompatible with the Torah than evolution. Even Avodah Zara is preferable. This is not my attitude. The Rambam states that atheism is worse than Avodah Zara. And evolution is nothing but atheism dressed up in scientific garb. Any Orthodox Jew who attends conferences on evolution is taking his life in his hands. Even if he manages to hold on to his emunah, he is tainted. No less than the garbage man who reeks to high heaven even though he is cleaning out the garbage.

Friday, May 6, 2011

Single-Minded People

Rabbi Slifkin’s strident and ongoing disparagement of Chazal's wisdom remains unchecked. This is demonstrated most keenly in his treatment of the halachic definition of death. In this recent post, Rabbi Slifkin reiterates several of his previous assertions regarding this issue and even adds one for good measure. His shoddy scholarship is actually shocking. Here are a few examples.

And so, while Dr. Stadlan is absolutely correct to state that when babies are born with extra appendages or organs, they are considered to be two persons when they have two heads - it should be noted that Chazal did not view it that way!

This is unbelievable! Anyone opening a gemara Menachos 37a-b will see that a two-headed firstborn requires 10 selaim for pidyon haben! This gemara is juxtaposed with Rabbi Slifkin’s gemara regarding Palemo and Rebbi. If anything, this gemara can be brought as proof that Chazal understood a two-headed person as two distinct persons, not one.

In my monograph The Question of the Kidneys' Counsel, I showed how Chazal believed that significant components of the mind are located in the chest cavity - in the heart, kidneys, and other innards - rather than in the brain.

This assertion was already refuted here and here and yet Rabbi Slifkin continues to repeat the same error. Incidentally, Rabbi Slifkin did not claim that “significant components of the mind are located in the heart, kidneys, and other innards - rather than in the brain”. He claimed that Chazal believed that the mind was located in the heart and kidneys and not the brain, period. He seems to be engaging in some creative back-pedaling.

Accordingly, dicephalus twins — conjoined twins with a single trunk and one head — were regarded as a single person with two heads. We see this in the way that the Gemara presents the question mentioned above. The Gemara discusses the question of upon which head such a person (described in the singular!) should place tefillin.

We see nothing of the sort. Mee'ma nafshach; even if Palemo and the rest of Chazal held that a two headed person was definitely only one person, Palemo should still have asked the question differently. He should have asked, “Does a two-headed person need to put tefilin on both heads or can he be yotzeh the mitvah by putting on tefilin on one head”? The format of Palemo’s question is equally puzzling regardless of Chazal’s position regarding “two-headed personage”. Accordingly, Rabbi Slifkin’s “proof” is no proof at all.

Monday, May 2, 2011

“Frogs” Challenge Materialism, not Rationalism

What is “Rationalist Judaism”? What do we mean when we say that Rav Saadya Gaon, the Rambam, and others, adopted the “Rationalist Approach” to Judaism?

What it means is that these great men strove to explicate the Torah in a manner which corresponds to our human frame of reference. That is, it accords with our daily experiences of the world. They sought explanations which could be deduced by the unaided human intellect as opposed to explanations which require an appeal to especial “revealed” knowledge. But this does not mean that they rejected revelation chs’v. They understood that the explanations Chazal offered were true beyond a shadow of doubt. As Rambam writes in his preface to his Pirush Mishnayos (my translation):

“And this fourth matter, that is, the exegetical sayings found in the Talmud, should not be considered trivial or of little benefit, for they are of enormous benefit in that they encompass within them the most profound allusions and wondrous ideas. When an appropriately deep examination of these sayings is conducted, the absolute good which cannot be surpassed can be gleaned from them. All of the lofty concepts and profound verities that the greatest of wise men concealed in their teachings, all of the conclusions that the philosophers toiled over throughout the generations, all can be revealed in their [Chazal’s] words…” (Kapach ed. pg. 19)

Why the Rambam in the Moreh and others chose to develop the Rationalist approach is not our topic. Suffice to say that there are sound historical, sociological and theological bases for their decisions. What we need to clarify is the following. Is the “Rationalist Approach” limited to purely naturalistic explanations, or is it also able to accommodate the supernatural? Ostensibly, the answer would seem to be the former. After all, the Rationalist approach eschews an appeal to revealed knowledge, does it not?

No, it does not! The supernatural fits perfectly well with the Rationalist approach. Here’s an example. An individual approaches the owner of an apple orchard and informs him that if he does not repent God will change all of the apples on his trees to rotten oranges. The farmer does not repent and lo and behold the apples transform to inedible oranges the very next day. What does rationality demand from us? Does it demand that we search for a naturalistic explanation for this phenomenon or does it enjoin us to admit to the supernatural?

Let’s say we are stubborn. Let’s say we decide to look for a materialistic explanation, no matter how improbable. But what happens if this type of phenomenon occurs again? What happens if the aforementioned individual approaches the orchard owner once again and informs him that if he does not repent every firstborn animal in his farm will die the next day? What happens if this actually occurs? What would rationality dictate to us then? Would we still look for naturalistic explanations?

The plagues in Egypt were all supernatural. Every single Rishon maintains this view, without exception. The Rambam writes that one of the reasons we have a mitzvah of sipur yetzias mitzraim on Pesach night is because the events that happened there were so fantastic they serve as proof positive that Prophecy is a real phenomenon! The Rambam didn’t look for naturalistic explanations for the plagues. The Rambam was the consummate rationalist and yet he understood that rationality can lead us to adopt conclusions that fall squarely outside of the parameters of “political, social and psychological” causes.

Rabbi Slifkin would like to understand every event in history within the parameters of naturalistic explanations. He wants to understand the word tzfardea in the Torah as referring to the plague in general rather than a single frog. Presumably he possesses a naturalistic explanation for each one of the ten plagues, including the death of the first-born. But suddenly he finds a species of frog that gives birth from its back and begins to question his allegiance to rationalism. He writes:

Remarkably, then, the same extraordinary birthing procedures that are attributed to the frog of Egypt are actually found in real frogs today. What are we to make of this?

To be sure, he does not find any chizuk from this phenomenon as a parallel to the plague in Egypt. On the contrary he writes:

I would not infer that it was those species of frogs that acted in the Egyptian plague. After all, these frogs are not found anywhere near Egypt and were unknown until quite recently; nor are they capable of giving birth to enough young to swarm over the entire country.

Nevertheless, the fact that Rabbi Slifkin happens to have now encountered a vague physical counterpart to the supernatural explanation of Chazal causes him to admit that:

it seems just too extraordinary to dismiss as coincidence - that the two bizarre methods of reproduction described in the Midrash just so happen to actually occur with frogs, of all the different creatures in the world

Rabbi Slifkin’s confusion is borne of a simple error; rationalism does not equal materialism.

"Frogs" According to Chazal

A few months ago, Rabbi Slifkin posted the following complaint.

This past Shabbos was a case in point. The passuk says ותעל הצפרדע - "And the frog came up, and covered the land of Egypt." Why does it say "frog" in the singular? As Junior told me, there was originally only one monstrous frog, and when the Egyptians beat the awesome amphibian, it became many millions.

In fairness to his teacher, I'd bet that 95% of Orthodox Jews think that this is the peshat. Or at least, they will claim that it's Rashi's peshat. But it isn't.

The aforementioned explanation is a Midrash. Rashi does indeed mention it - explicitly describing it as the derush. And Rashi also notes that the peshat is that a swarm of frogs is called "frog" in the singular - just as in English we speak of a "frog plague," not a "frogs plague."

Rabbi Slifkin is making a category error. There are midrashim which are rachok (distant) from the peshuto shel mikra (plain meaning of the verses) and there are aggados which are karov (close) to the peshuto shel mikra. The latter form of derush is used constantly by Rashi in conjunction with, and as a reinforcement of the peshuto shel mikra. Rashi explains his modus operandi clearly in Bereishis 3:8 and other places. The fact is, the vast majority of Rashi’s peirush al haTorah is comprised of drashos Chazal which are karov to pshat and Rashi uses these drashos to be miyashev the pesukim in the Torah "davar dibur al ofanav".

Sometimes Rashi brings drashos which are distant from the pashut pshat (plain meaning) of the pesukim. But whenever he does, he mentions them second (e.g. Vayikra 26:17, Bamidbar 15:41, Bamidbar 19:22). If the midrash appears first, this is a sign that Rashi felt that the drasha was karov to the pashut pshat if not pshat itself. In the case of the frogs, Rashi brings Rabbi Slifkin’s medrash right at the beginning which indicates that this is the pashut psaht of the term tzfardea in the Torah.

The proper way to understand this Rashi is as follows. The term tzfardea does indeed mean one frog. After all, the term tzfardea is singular making “one frog” the simple translation of this term. However, Rashi then goes on to explain that even if Chazal would not have revealed this drasha to us, the pesukim could still have maintained grammatical consistency because often times the singular form is used to modify the plural in the Hebrew language. Thus, both interpretations are pashut pshat! The Torah wants to tell us that the plague of frogs came upon the Egyptians while simultaneously telling us the method. It thus uses the singular term and kills two birds with one stone (or rather, one frog with several smacks).

Thursday, April 28, 2011

The Heart of the Matter

In a recent post, Rabbi Slifkin took Ami Magazine to task for their article entitled "The Imposters Among Us". I haven’t had the opportunity to read the essay in question (the online version is garbled and unprintable) so I cannot comment on Rabbi Slifkin’s analysis. However, something struck me as being fundamentally wrong with his presentation. I actually had to read it three times before I was able to pinpoint the problem. Rabbi Slifkin writes as follows:

The intellectual challenges to Judaism are very real. Fortunate are those of us whose sense of Divine providence in Jewish history, and whose appreciation of the nature and role of the Torah, as well as other factors, enables us to maintain belief in revelation; but if we are honest, we will acknowledge that there are nevertheless intellectual challenges to which Judaism presently does not have a good response. Can we really be hostile towards those who consider the challenges overpowering?

This paragraph, and all that it implies, is a vivid reflection of Rabbi Slifkin’s general approach to Jewish theology (hashkafa) and is the primary cause of the opposition generated by the authors of this blog, indeed, by any Jew who adheres to our Torah traditions as transmitted by Chazal and Rishonim.

Let’s dissect his statement.

"The intellectual challenges to Judaism are very real."

No, they’re not. They seem real to some Jews, just as they seemed real to the Jewish Hellenists, the Sadducees, the Essenes, the early Hebrew Christians, the Karaites, Moses Mendelssohn and the Haskala, the Reformers and others. But the truth is, Judaism, and all of its fundamental tenets, is firmly founded on rationality and logic. Furthermore, it is supported by an endless amount of historical, archeological and empirical evidence. Anyone who makes an honest effort to understand will be rewarded with all the support he needs to reinforce his convictions. Unfortunately, Rabbi Slifkin has made a career of pointing out the ostensible "challenges" to our mesorah and thus, at times, seems unable to see the simple truth which stares him in the face.

"Fortunate are those of us whose sense of Divine providence in Jewish history, and whose appreciation of the nature and role of the Torah, as well as other factors, enables us to maintain belief in revelation; but if we are honest, we will acknowledge that there are nevertheless intellectual challenges to which Judaism presently does not have a good response."

This is just a bunch of fluff. It’s a way of holding on to a seriously flawed approach to hashkafa while simultaneously pledging allegiance to the cause. Anyone who possesses a real "sense of Divine providence’, anyone who possesses a real "appreciation of the nature and role of the Torah", would not be so easily swayed by the vacuous claims of the academics, secularists and materialists. He would recognize the superiority of his traditions over those of the gentiles and laugh at their feeble attempts to undermine our Torah. If on occasion he was faced with a question that he was unable to answer, he would not publicly characterize it as a "real challenge to Judaism". Rather, he would say what R’ Akiva Eiger was wont to say: "tzarich iyun gadol va’Hashem ya’ir eini". It requires further research and I pray to Hashem that He reveal the answer to me, that’s it. But he would never doubt the veracity of our received traditions especially when they have been proven to be correct time and time again.

On occasion, Rabbi Slifkin does indeed raise valid questions which have to be addressed but in the vast majority of cases his issues are easily able to be dealt with. The element of uncertainty and obscurity which typically attend his writings introduces unwarranted doubt and groundless suspicion in the minds of his readers. And that’s really too bad.

"Can we really be hostile towards those who consider the challenges overpowering?"

I guess that depends. If these people are vocal with their doubts, if they routinely undermine our mesorah and its torchbearers in public venues, then yes, they should be vilified. If they maintain private doubts, then no, we should not be hostile towards them. Rather we should enjoin them to seek assistance from competent individuals. Personally, I recommend listening to the shiurim of HaRav Avigdor Miller ztz’l.

Monday, March 14, 2011

The Invention of Chesed

Dear Readers,

Due to technical (mainly temporal) constraints, I have been unable to dedicate any significant time to this venue. On the other hand, I feel that its ongoing existence is of value. I have chosen a random post by Rabbi Slifkin to comment on. If any readers would like me to post on a particular topic, please contact me at rivkyc@sympatico.ca

About two weeks ago, Rabbi Slifkin chose to broach the topic of "mushulachim". He writes as follows:

"Recently, a chassidishe tzedakah-collector came to my door, collecting for a young man getting married. I asked him what the young man does, and the meshulach looked a little surprised at my question; the young man is in yeshivah, of course, a fine ben Torah. So I asked how he can possibly spend all his time in yeshivah, when he cannot afford to get married and has to send people to collect money for him? Does it not say in the kesubah that the husband has an obligation to support his wife? Is it not his duty to at least attempt to earn some money himself?"

Hmm… I wonder how much research Rabbi Slifkin actually did regarding the prospective groom. Not much, it seems. The meshulach informed him that the chasan was a Yeshiva man and immediately Rabbi Slifkin responded with unsupported criticism.

"how he can possibly spend all his time in yeshivah?"

Who says he spends all his time in Yeshiva? Maybe he works part-time and can’t make ends meet?

"and has to send people to collect money for him"

Who says he sent anyone to collect money for him? Maybe his friend sympathized with his situation and decided to collect funds for his wedding?

"Does it not say in the kesubah that the husband has an obligation to support his wife?"

So, is that it? Is hachnasos kallah (openly mandated in Maseches Peah) now taboo because some 20 year old doesn’t have a job? Sure the kesuba mandates an obligation but the boy is not married yet. Perhaps he intends on finding gainful employment after marriage? What is Rabbi Slifkin saying? Is he advocating trade school, or university, for all post-high school graduates? Is he suggesting that the Yeshiva system be abrogated? If not, what IS he suggesting? Why did he give the meshulach such a hard time?

Look, I know many readers are probably thinking "this Coffer fellow is naïve", at best. But this issue has been a sore point in the Chareidi world for quite some time now. And although I could understand Rabbi Slifkin’s attitude if it pertained to a 45 year old kollel fellow with 10 kids, I can’t understand it regarding a young unmarried yeshiva boy who happens to be monetarily disadvantaged. Anything between these two extremes is a grey area and needs to be dealt with on a national level by competent gedolei torah, and on an individual level, by competent rabbonim.

If Rabbi Slifkin would like to reform "the system", let him say so. And while doing that, let him offer positive and constructive suggestions to promote same.

To quote the good Rabbi: "it is always easier to obfuscate and distort than to untangle and clarify"

SC