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Thursday, October 6, 2011

Rambam and Chazal - Part 2

In his post entitled Musta Jew Believe Anything?, Rabbi Slifkin endorses M. Kellner’s view that Maimonidean theology considers the refinement of the intellect as the goal of Judaism whereas the “normative” approach to Judaism considers the physical performance of mitzvos as the ultimate achievement of mankind. And while this author strongly disagrees with this characterization, the purpose of this blog entry is not to point out the fallacies inherent in this attitude. Rather, its function is the analysis of the evidence Rabbi Slifkin delineates in support of his position. Here’s what he writes:

The most striking example of the difference between Rambam's view and that of classical Judaism emerges from comparing the Talmud's discussion of conversion to Judaism with that of Rambam.

Rabbi Slifkin then juxtaposes the following two quotes, the first from the gemara, the second from the Rambam.

The Rabbis taught: If someone comes to convert, we say to him: “Why do you see fit to convert… If he says, “I know, and I am unworthy,” we accept him immediately. We inform him of a few light mitzvot and a few serious mitzvot… we do not overwhelm him, and we are not exacting with him… (Yevamos 47a)

And here is how Rambam paraphrases it:

How do we accept righteous converts… When a gentile comes to convert… we say to him, “Why do you see fit to convert… If he says, “I know, and I am unworthy,” we accept him immediately. And we inform him of the fundamentals of religion, which are the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and we dwell upon this at length. And we inform him of a few light mitzvot and a few serious mitzvot, but we do not dwell upon this at length… (Hilchos Issurei Biyah 14:1-2)

Rabbi Slifkin then makes the following comment:

Look at the sentence that Rambam inserted! One might quibble with the degree to which Kellner sets Chazal and Rambam at odds with each other, but there can be no denying that there was a tremendous gulf between them…

There can be “no denying” the “tremendous gulf”… all due to the insertion of one sentence… amazing.

First of all, any seasoned yeshiva man understands that Rambam’s halachos often contain subtle variations from the text of the Talmud. In fact, one of our largest bodies of literature is dedicated specifically to the explication of the Rambam when he seems to diverge from the pashtus of the gemara. The underlying idea which weaves its way through this unique corpus of scholarship is the awareness that Rambam must ultimately be reconciled with the gemara. There are over three hundred books written on the Yad HaChazaka and all of them adhere to this principle. Accordingly, the first place Rabbi Slifkin should have looked is in the mifarshei haRambam. Had he done so, he would have found the following: 

1) Rambam Hil. Issurei Biya 14:1-2 – Informing a potential convert of the fundamentals of religion is not the only thing Rambam added in paraphrasing the Braisa in Yevamos. He also added the halacha of hatafas dam bris for a ger who is born mahul (making a cut and drawing a small amount of blood in a case where the potential convert is born without a foreskin). This clearly blunts the force of Rabbi Slifkin’s argument from Rambam’s other addition.    

2) Magid Mishna (ad loc.) – Magid Mishna explains that although Rambam’s dictum (delineating at length the prohibition of idolatry) is not found in the Braisa, Rambam added it because he felt that it was pashut. The process of conversion entails a fundamental change of attitude, the adoption of a brand new theology. Naturally the basic tenets of Judaism must be explained at length. Anyone reading the MM can clearly see that his explanation is specifically designed to reconcile the Rambam with the Gemara, not to put the two at odds.

3) Keser Mishna (ad loc.) – Keser Mishna not only concurs with Magid Mishna’s interpretation of the Rambam, he presents an indication that MM is correct from the gemara itself (the following is a Talmudic line of reasoning).

Maharsha (ad loc.) questions the necessity of informing a potential convert of the prohibition of idolatry (Naomi and Rus – Yevamos 47b). After all, gentiles are already prohibited from same. Based on this question, Keser Mishna concludes that the implication of the gemara is that the Oneness of Hashem (i.e. the rejection of idolatry) must be explained to the convert at length (as opposed to a discussion of the physical mitzvos which requires brevity). According to Keser Mishna the gemara itself is a plausible source for the Rambam’s halacha. The conclusion MM arrived at is actually indicated in the very words of Chazal.

4) Aruch La’ner (ad loc.). AL broaches Rabbi Sifkin’s question. In fact he expands on it. Not only is the obligation to discus the fundamentals of Judaism absent from the Braisa, the very notion that one must expand upon them (at length) contravenes the spirit of the Braisa which enjoins brevity. AL posits the following.

During the course of discussion, the Braisa suddenly inserts the injunction that we must inform the potential convert that the Jewish nation is unable to receive an abundance of affliction. What is this doing in the middle of the Braisa? The answer is, since we have frightened the potential convert by telling him so much about our afflictions (afflicted, harassed, downtrodden, oppressed etc.) we switch tracks and console him. We let him know that there is a limit to the afflictions of our nation. This idea is in line with the other words of consolation the Braisa lists (e.g. reward for mitzvos).

This pattern, claims AL, is the source for Rambam’s assertion. The gemara (47b) explains that the reason we are brief with a potential convert is because we learn from Naomi and Rus and in that case Naomi was warning Rus, not encouraging her. From this we see that the concept of brevity applies only to negative reinforcement. The implication is that speaking positively about our religion, speaking words which explain its tenets and compel the convert to keep them is exempt from the injunction of “brevity”. On the contrary, it is encouraged. This is why Rambam maintains that we should speak at length to the convert about the fundamentals of our religion.

5) Rashi states openly that the injunction of brevity applies solely to words of “warning” (47b s.v. v’ein).

In view of the preceding shakla v’tarya, in view of the fact that the Rambam adds more than just the injunction for teaching fundamentals, in view of the opinion of the Magid Mishnah, the Keser Mishna, the Aruch La’Ner, Rashi, and the implication from Maharsha’s question, it would seem clear that Rambam can easily be aligned with Chazal.

The preceding presentation was a standard Talmudic analysis of the sugya at hand. It was not too complicated and did not require the invocation of “deep reasoning powers” (pilpul). Rabbi Slifkin could have easily researched the sugya just as we did. Instead he chose to draw the most outlandish conclusions based on an extra sentence in the Rambam without any research whatsoever. Had he investigated the sugya properly, he would have never claimed that the supposed gulf between Rambam and Chazal is “undeniable”, at least not on the heels of his quotation from the Rambam in Hil. IB.

This concludes our treatment of the Gemara in Yevamos and the Rambam in Hil. Issurei Biya. Comments welcome…

Rambam and Chazal - Part 1

This post is a continuation of our recent post entitled The Heart of the Matter and is written specifically for the purpose of responding to one of the remarks found in the comments section of the aforementioned post.

In his post entitled “Must a Jew Believe Anything?”, Rabbi Slifkin discusses some of M. Kellner’s views on the philosophy of Maimonides. Since Rabbi Slifkin enthusiastically endorses Kellner’s ideas, it behooves us to analyze the Kellner/Slifkin approach to see if it satisfies the rigorous standards of mainstream Torah scholarship.

Rabbi Slifkin, quoting M. Kellner, avers that Rambam’s primary theological focus is the status of the mind. According to Rabbi Slifkin, Rambam understood the goal of Judaism as the perfection of the intellect. Accordingly, it would seem to follow that the commandments of the Torah which enjoin physical activity do not possess independent qualities of goodness. In and of themselves they do not serve to increase the quality of the human condition; rather, they are vehicles for the refinement of the human mind, the intellect.

And while there is certainly room to dispute this notion, on a certain level it seems valid, enjoying support both in the works of Maimonides and Chazal. For instance, the Medrash Tanchuma (Shemini 8) asks:

Does the Holy One, Blessed be He really care if we slaughter an animal and eat it…or does He care if we eat pure [animals] or impure?... Behold the commandments were given only to perfect mankind…                     

But then Rabbi Slifkin writes as follows:

Kellner then proceeds to discuss Rambam's view of the role of belief in Judaism and how it differs from the normative view. For Rambam, influenced as he was by Greco-Muslim philosophy, perfecting the intellect (which requires correct beliefs) is the goal of Judaism. Thus, those who believe in a corporeal God have utterly failed as Jews, no matter how many mitzvos they perform; whereas Ra'avad, reflecting the normative position, considered such people to be fine Jews, some of them even greater than Rambam (albeit mistaken).

Here’s where the Kellner/Slifkin approach begins to deteriorate. Ra’avad is clearly not disputing Rambam’s inclusion of Divine Corporeality into the categories of Heresy because he believed that people who do mitzvos are fine Jews despite their beliefs, and even better than the Rambam. If this was so, he would have disputed all five categories of heresy, not just corporeality. Ra’avad explains his position! The reason he disputes the specific category of Corporeality is because both the Torah and Chazal consistently use anthropomorphic descriptions of God. As such, Ra’avad considered the adoption of corporeality a legitimate error as opposed to the adoption of a heretical belief. See Kesef Mishna ad loc. who concurs with this understanding of the Ra’avad. Also, see Sefer haIkkarim for an alternative (and vastly toned down) version of the Ra’avad’s comment and an in-depth treatment of the machlokes between the Rambam and Ra’avad. Anyone studying these sources will immediately discern the erroneousness of the Kellner/Slifkin approach to the comment of the Ra’avad.

Unfortunately we have not yet addressed the concerns of the commenter mentioned at the beginning of this post. Accordingly, part 2 of this post will B’H continue with an extensive treatment of Rabbi Slifkin’s assertion that the contrast between the Braisa in Yevamos (47a) which outlines the parameters of proper conversion and the Rambam’s paraphrasing of that Braisa in the Yad serves as “the most striking example of the difference between Rambam's view and that of classical Judaism”.    

Stay tuned…

Rambam and Greek Astronomy

In our previous post, we wrote as follows:

Furthermore, he [Rambam] makes countless scientific type statements (i.e. statements which relate to various laws of nature such as ein bishul achar bishul etc.) that are based entirely on Chazal with nary a twitter of dissent. This alone should be an obvious indication of the Rambam’s opinion regarding not only the halachos of Chazal but also their science.

Although, as I mentioned, when it came to almost all disciplines the Rambam was machniya himself to the view of our sages, when it came to astronomy it seems that he leaned towards the wisdom of the Greek astronomers and their writings. This is most apparent in the Rambam’s writings on Kiddush haChodesh and seems puzzling in view of the Rambam’s normal modus operandi. In fact, this aberration is so uncharacteristic of the Rambam that he himself senses it and states as follows: (my translation)

and it should not be strange in your eyes that the view of Aristotle (which the Rambam accepts) is opposed to the view of our sages of blessed memory in this matter, for this view, that is, if they [the heavenly bodies] make noise is associated with the view of a fixed sphere and moving stars and you already know that the wisdom of the gentiles was decisive, in the matter of astronomy, over the wisdom of our sages as the sages themselves openly state ‘and the sages of the gentiles have triumphed’… (Moreh 2:8 Kapach ed. pg. 180)

Now before we go on it is important to note that in order to dismiss the view of the sages the Rambam first appealed to a direct quotation from Chazal. Thus, he supported his approach to astronomy by illustrating that Chazal themselves admitted defeat in this matter.

However, notwithstanding the Rambam’s hisnatzlus in this matter, Chazal’s seeming lack of knowledge in the field of astronomy when compared to that of the Greek's seems incongruous with the Rambam’s characterization of our sage’s wisdom. After all, wasn’t it the Rambam himself who stated in Pirush Mishnayos that:

All of the lofty concepts and profound verities that the greatest of wise men concealed in their teachings, all of the conclusions that the philosophers toiled over throughout the generations, all can be revealed in their [Chazal’s] words…

The implication is that our ba’alei mesorah were somehow aware of the greatest truths that all of the naturalists, all of the philosophers, all of the sages of the nations were able to reveal. If so, how could the wisdom of astronomy have escaped them?

But the mystery is cleared up once one reads the Rambam in the Yad Hilchos Kiddush haChodesh. The truth is our nation did have a tradition regarding astronomical calculations which originated with the biney Yisaschar and was passed down during the times of the neveim. Unfortunately, this discipline was lost during the Babylonian exile and thus our sages had no choice but to rely on the calculations of the Greek astronomers. (Rambam Hilchos Kiddush haChodesh 17:24)

Do not think it was strange that Chazal relied on the Greeks for astronomy. The Greeks were incredibly accurate with their calculations. For example, W.M. Feldman in his 1931 text (page 131) reports that Hipparchus, an ancient Greek astronomer, recorded the time between an eclipse measured by the Babylonians and one measured by himself less than 400 years later. He found that there were 4,267 lunations and that the exact duration was 126,007 days and 1 hour. Thus, the average lunation in terms of days would be 3,024,169 hours divided by 24 divided by 4,267 lunations equaling 29.53059 days. This is astounding as it is only one half second off from present day calculations for the average Sinodic month!

(To the reader: I do not have a copy of Feldman’s book. If memory serves, I was informed of this calculation by one of my colleagues. I double checked the math and it works but if someone has access to Feldman’s book (Rabbinical Mathematics and Astronomy) I would appreciate verification of the above.)

In conclusion, the fact that the Rambam accepted one or two statements of the Greek astronomers over those of Chazal is an aberration. It is an extremely rare exception and can in no way be used as an indication of how the Rambam felt regarding the status of Chazal’s scientific knowledge. Unfortunately, the academic world loves to tout this instance as an example (of supposedly many more examples) of the Rambam’s general attitude to Chazal. What is even more unfortunate is that they’ve managed to infiltrate our ranks. They’ve managed to generate a whole deal of obfuscation and even managed to influence one of our more talented Chareidi (former) brethren to adopt their views and make it the clarion call of his Rationalist Blog. Chaval al di’avdin… 

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

The Heart of the Matter

In his most recent post, Rabbi Slifkin gives the nod to Menachem Kellner’s book Must a Jew Believe Anything. In so doing, Rabbi Slifkin once again brings into sharp focus the raison d'ĂȘtre of this blog. Rabbi Slifkin writes that “One might quibble with the degree to which Kellner sets Chazal and Rambam at odds with each other, but there can be no denying that there was a tremendous gulf between them”. This, of course, is the fundamental premise which informs the field of “Maimonidean studies” in Western academic scholarship. It is also the furthest thing from the truth. Anyone with even a passing familiarity with Rambam’s works understands the absurdity of such an assertion.

First of all, a simple appeal to common sense reveals the fallacy of Rabbi Slifkin’s approach to the Rambam. The Rambam’s most important work, the Yad haChazaka, is based entirely on the words of Chazal (other than the first four chapters of Hilchos Yesodei haTorah where the Rambam takes some of his ideas from Greek philosophy). Now, as a free and independent thinker, what are the statistical probabilities that the Rambam would concur with Chazal’s opinions in each and every one of his myriad halachos? If the term ‘impossible’ could ever be employed, this scenario would surely be a prime candidate. And yet the Rambam never digresses from Chazal. The entire Yad is the Rambam’s expressed opinion based solely on what he understood as the final conclusions of our sages both in matters which pertain to actions and matters which pertain to attitudes of the mind.

Furthermore, he makes countless scientific type statements (i.e. statements which relate to various laws of nature such as ein bishul achar bishul etc.) that are based entirely on Chazal with nary a twitter of dissent. This alone should be an obvious indication of the Rambam’s opinion regarding not only the halachos of Chazal but also their science.

The truth is the Rambam’s opinion of Chazal was so elevated that he annulled himself entirely to their view. If one wishes to understand the ‘essence’ of the Rambam in these matters, to understand the underlying premise which pervades all of his writings, the following select quotations from the Rambam’s preface to his Pirush HaMishnayos are edifying. The translation is mine and is based on Kapach’s edition of Pirush HaMishnayos l’Harambam.    

“And this fourth matter, that is, the exegetical sayings found in the Talmud, should not be considered trivial or of little benefit, for they are of enormous benefit in that they encompass within them the most profound allusions and wondrous ideas. When an appropriately deep examination of these sayings is conducted, the absolute good which cannot be surpassed can be gleaned from them. All of the lofty concepts and profound verities that the greatest of wise men concealed in their teachings, all of the conclusions that the philosophers toiled over throughout the generations, all can be revealed in their [Chazal’s] words…” (Kapach ed. pg. 19)

“And therefore, we must establish the truth of their (Chazal’s) words in our hearts. We must delve deeply into them and not hurry to dismiss a single saying of theirs. Rather, if something is found in their words which seems strange in our eyes, we must orient ourselves in the appropriate [corresponding] disciplines until we understand their meaning in this particular topic, assuming that we are even able to comprehend [their words] in the first place. For even our [latter] sages of blessed memory, despite the fact that they delved exceedingly into their studies, were clear of mind, were appropriately fit for the comprehension of wisdom, attached themselves to great people and entirely detached themselves from material pursuits, [and yet despite all this they] attributed a ‘lacking’ to themselves when comparing themselves to previous generations…so much more so ourselves…how can we not attribute a lacking to ourselves in comparison to them. And since they [the latter sages] knew that all of the words of the sages are well established from every angle, they were very protective of them and enjoined against slandering them and stated ‘whomsoever blandishes the words of the sages is judged in boiling feces’ and there is no worse ‘boiling feces’ than the foolishness that leads one to denigrate [the words of our sages]. And therefore, you will never find one rejecting their words but one who chases after lust, who favors materialism, who never enlightened his mind with any illumination whatsoever.” (Kapach ed. pg. 20-21)

Well, there we go. This is what the Rambam really felt about our sages. Those who portray the Rambam as an avant-garde thinker who forged a new path in the explication of Judaism even when it contradicted the opinions of the sages are far from a proper understanding of the Rambam’s true weltanschauung. The Western academic view of the Rambam amounts to nothing more than intellectual sophistry if not outright dishonesty. Dovid haMelech’s saying comes to mind: “lo yadu, v’lo yavinu, ba’chasheicha yis’halachu”.

Now to be fair it is well-known that Rambam was criticized by many gedolim for his involvement in philosophy. The Gra asserts that philosophy caused the Rambam to err in some of his Torah conclusions and the truth is the Rambam himself bemoans the fact that whereas initially he set out to make philosophy a handmaiden to the Torah, ultimately it became a competitor. But none of this detracts from what we are saying v'hameivin yavin.       

Monday, September 26, 2011

Credible Science

Recently a group of scientists with the European Organization for Nuclear Research reported that over a three year period they had fired 15,000 neutrino beams approximately 750 kilometers away to a lab in Italy and found that the beams arrived 6 billionths of a second faster than the speed of light. Before announcing what they had found, the physicists working on the experiment claim that they checked and rechecked their findings over many months eliminating anything that could have produced a misreading. They then presented their findings to a room full of skeptical scientists.

Rabbi Slifkin writes as follows:

A number of people wrote to me about last week's report that a group of scientists at CERN tentatively claimed to have measured neutrino particles traveling faster than the speed of light - which modern science, based on special relativity, deems impossible. "If scientists were wrong about this, then maybe they were wrong about everything!" Maybe the universe isn't really 14 billion years old - maybe it's only 5771 years old!

To this question, Rabbi Slifkin offers the following sagely response.

Of course, the correct view is that some scientific facts are better grounded than others. Scientists might have to change their mind one day about the universe being 14 billion years old, but they are not going to discover that it is only a few thousand years old… For the non-specialist, it might be difficult to determine how well-established different scientific facts are. But it should be relatively easy to find out that the issues which concern (some) Jews - the antiquity of the universe, the common ancestry of living creatures, the non-existence of a global Flood… are very well grounded and will not ever be overturned.

All I can do is shake my head in disbelief, or perhaps, despair. For those interested in the truth, here are some facts.

Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity has been tested thousands of times in the past hundred years. It is hard to find a more solidly based “scientific fact” than Special Relativity (SR). The CERN report is startling! And if it turns out to be true, it has the potential of overturning the entire science of Physics as we know it.

Here’s another fact. Evolutionary Common Ancestry (ECA) has never been tested, not even once! The entire theory is based on wild and un-testable speculation, nothing else. Furthermore, there isn’t even a shred of evidence for ECA. On the contrary, the fossil record reveals the sudden appearance of life-forms, a scenario that is diametrically opposed to that of ECA.

Here’s yet another fact. The age of the universe (13.7byr) is based on a theory which is entirely speculative. Big Bang Cosmology (BBC) is based on assumptions that have never been proven. Its fundamental tenets are opposed by contradictory evidence which can only be reconciled by inventing hypothetical entities which have never been observed to exist.

To equate SR with ECA and BBC is the height of scientific folly. The former is founded on solid evidence and extensive experimentation. The latter two are not. The fact that Rabbi Slifkin is able to equate SR with ECA and BBC, indeed even consider the latter two more well-founded than the former, clearly demonstrates his lack of understanding regarding the level of scientific evidence attributable to these theories. The truth is Rabbi Slifkin’s readers are right. If even Special Relativity can be questioned this should serve as a wake-up call to people like Rabbi Slifkin who allow silly theories like ECA to mold their theology in direct contradiction to our well-supported and rational traditions.  

As far as the non-existence of the global flood, I would love to know how scientists are absolutely sure this phenomenon never existed. I would also like to know how Rabbi Slifkin accounts for the presence of marine fossils on the tops of mountains all over the world. This, of course, is only one of many lines of evidence for a global flood. The Christian creationists have done a lovely job documenting the evidence for a global flood and the evidence is compelling. And although they deserve a big yasher koach for their efforts, it’s really too bad. We should be the ones on the forefront of defending the Torah. Instead, we are doing our best to align ourselves with the speculative drivel of the atheistic scientific community in direct contradiction to our ancient and well-founded traditions. Shame on us...

Sunday, September 25, 2011

Esrogim – More of the Same

In response to our previous post, Rabbi Slifkin posted a clarification of his original position. Unfortunately his elucidation did not provide any clarity. In fact, it had the complete opposite effect. Here are his words followed by our analysis.

Rav Ettlinger was well aware that there is no absolute frame of reference. Indeed, in formulating his question, he himself says that the same question applies the other way around… But in my view… this sort of question would not be asked today. It would be inconceivable to us to be concerned about the position of the tree in Australia relative to Israel, and vice-versa… This question was only asked by Rav Ettlinger because people at that time were still in the process of internalizing the knowledge of the shape of the world…

As they say in the colloquial, this is bubba maasos! Rabbi Etlinger penned his  teshuva over 350 years after mankind became aware that the world was round! On the contrary, it was this awareness, and its internalization, that was the very cause of Rabbi Etlinger’s halachic quandary. Since the world is round, therefore the derech gidul is different in Australia than it is in Israel and we now have a sha’ala; which frame of reference should be used to define the halachic requirement of derech gidulo? Should we use the geographical growth of the lulav, or should we use the geographical location of its owner? Without a round world, an upside-down lulav sha’ala would be incoherent.

All this is obvious to the unbiased individual. Unfortunately Rabbi Slifkin is on a mission. He is constantly on the lookout for examples which, to his mind, demonstrate the fallibility of our ba’alei mesorah. His eagerness to demonstrate the advanced sensibilities of the modern man over his predecessors is what caused him to pen his original erroneous post. And it is precisely this eagerness which caused him to defend his position with an argument that is as equally erroneous as his initial one.

Please note: It is not my intention to highlight Rabbi Slifkin’s personal failings chs’v. This blog is above that (I hope). The purpose of this blog is to defend the validity of our mesorah against its attackers, foreign (goyim) or domestic (yidden). Rabbi Slifkin is a young, talented rabbi and a prolific writer. Unfortunately, he is on the wrong side of the fence.

Rabbi Slifkin writes as follows:

even we today have still not entirely internalized the correct view, and we feel uncomfortable with an "upside-down" map of the world.

This has nothing to do with the mandate of this blog but I’d like to comment on this statement.

First of all, we will always be uncomfortable with an upside-down map of the world. It is no different than trying to read a book upside down. We are used to seeing maps with North on top and South on the bottom. If one day they decide to make maps with South on top, then our previous comfort level will eventually change to conform to the new convention.

Second of all, I think I can offer an explanation as to why North was chosen as an absolute frame of reference (the other cardinal directions are defined as degrees from North) while simultaneously explaining why North is considered up and South down.

There are many stars in the sky and their seeming position changes over the course of the night as they appear to rotate around the earth’s celestial axis. Imagine a pole which travels through the center of the earth and upon which the earth rotates. This imaginary pole goes way up into the sky and the stars seem to change their positions at night as they rotate around this pole. Actually the earth is rotating and the stars are stationary but this is what appears to be happening. However, there is one visible exception to this rule.

The star Polaris remains relatively fixed above the North Pole. It is defined as the prominent (i.e. visible to the naked eye) star which lies directly overhead when viewed from the North Pole. Historically the North Star has served as an indispensible tool for purposes of navigation. This explains why North was chosen as an absolute frame of reference for the four cardinal directions and it also explains why North is synonymous with an upwards direction. How? Since North is identified as the direction which possesses a fixed star above it, it is thus used as the absolute direction from which the other directions flow. And since the defining element of the direction North is a star which is fixed above it in space, any point on earth below the North Pole is considered further below this star thereby making the direction North on earth an upwards direction.

I’m not such a chacham. I’m sure I read this somewhere, sometime. I just can’t find it right now. Maybe I’m wrong… comments welcome…

Friday, September 23, 2011

Lulavim and Rationalism

In his most recent post, Rabbi Slifkin tries to explain his rationalist approach to the statements of Chazal. He justifies this approach by pointing out that just because someone errs does not make him stupid. The adoption of this attitude is supposed to make it easier for the reader to swallow his rationalist approach to Chazal. It goes without saying that the authors of this blog possess a radically different opinion of the concept of "Rationalism" and how it interfaces with the statements of Chazal. But now is not the time and place. What I’d like to focus on is Rabbi Slifkin’s example. In his eagerness to demonstrate his point, he commits a serious blunder while simultaneously contravening his very own justification for Rationalism.

In reference to the halachic question of which direction an Australian lulav should be held by one who is celebrating Succos in the northern hemisphere, Rabbi Slifkin writes as follows:

No less an authority than Rav Yaakov Ettlinger, famed author of Aruch LaNer and a university graduate, discussed this question. He suggested that it was more reasonable that they should be held in the normal position. Others, however, apparently disagreed. To the modern reader, this sounds ludicrous. Australians are not "upside-down"! There is no absolute frame of reference! This case exemplifies the challenge that I have faced many times in teaching the rationalist approach to Chazal. Very few people are able to appreciate that errors made by people in very different eras and cultures do not reflect any sort of stupidity.

Wait a minute! R’ Yaakov Etlinger lived in the nineteenth century! He died just before Albert Einstein was born. He was aware of the law of gravity, he was aware of the vastness of space, and he was aware that the world was round. Concordantly, he should have been aware that people in Australia were not “upside down”. If his shaa’la hinged on the fact that Australians are "upside-down", it sounds pretty stupid, doesn’t it? According to Rabbi Slifkin, any “modern reader” understands the ludicrousness of this position. Why didn’t Rabbi Etlinger understand it?

The answer is, Rabbi Etlinger was not stupid at all. On the contrary, anyone who believes that Rabbi Etlinger committed such a serious faux pas is lacking in plain common sense. Rabbi Etlinger was not talking about Australians; he was talking about Australian lulavim and the direction they grow. When it comes to the concept of derech gidulo, there most definitely is an absolute frame of reference. It’s very simple. The direction a lulav grows in Australia is diametrically opposed to the direction a lulav grows in Alaska. Thus, an individual holding an Australian lulav in Alaska derech gidul of Alaska is holding the lulav upside down in reference to the derech gidul of Australia. This concept is simple. It requires a minimum of thought to grasp. So why didn’t Rabbi Slifkin pick up on it? There is a saying amongst our sages: ha’ahava mikalkeles es ha’shura. Loosely translated, "personal involvement corrupts common sense".