The Rambam’s Principle of The Illegitimacy of Extrapolating From Current Natural Processes To The Origins of Things

The following chapter from The Rambam’s Guide for The Perplexed offers an intriguing illustration of his principle that “it is quite impossible to infer, from the nature anything possesses after having been generated, and having attained its full development and attaining stability regarding its properties, what the condition of the thing had been at the time this process commenced.” Following the English translation is Rabbi Yosef KPCH’s Hebrew translation of the Arabic original. This translation was chosen for the convenience of replication on this blog, although the English translation was based on the classical Hebrew translation by Ibn Tibbon. )There is no pragmatic difference between the two Hebrew translations.

MOREH NEVUCHIM, PART II, CHAPTER XVII

ANYTHING new must [by definition] come into being after not having been [what it is]. This is so even if the thing’s substance had already existed, and the thing has only changed in its form. For its nature—after the thing’s having gone through the process of genesis, full development, and stability—is still not the nature it had at the commencement of its transition from potentiality to reality. And its nature is also other than what it was before it was caused to develop [from its potential] to its actuality.

For example, the nature of a female’s seed while it is [but] blood in its vessels, does not possess the nature it has at the time of pregnancy, when it begins to develop after being met by the male’s semen. And its nature then likewise is not that of the living being after its birth when fully developed. It is therefore quite impossible to infer, from the nature anything possesses after having been generated, and having attained its full development and attaining stability regarding its properties, what the condition of the thing had been at the time this process commenced. Nor does the condition of a thing while it is developing show what its condition had been before it began its development. When you err in this, and continue to construct the proof  from something’s nature as it is in actuality, for what its nature was while it was in potential existence, great problems will arise for you. You will consider things that must be true, as false; and you will consider things to be compellingly true, that are really false.

Let us imagine, continuing in the vein of our above example, that a child possessing full natural intelligence was born, but his mother died after nursing him several months; so the father alone brought him up on an isolated island, till he grew up, became wise, and acquired knowledge, [but the island is inhabited only by males,] and he has never seen a woman or any female creature.

He asks someone there, “How did we come into existence, and in what way did we develop [into what we are]?”

The man he asked replies, “Each one of us men actually came to being Man begins his existence in the belly of an individual of his own class, namely, in the womb of a female, which has such-and-such a form. Each one of us was a small body within that belly, that stayed alive, moved about, received nourishment, and grew little by little, until he arrived at a certain stage of development. An entrance-way would open for him in the lower part of that body from which he would exit.  And he does not stop growing,  until he is in the condition in which you see us.”

Now, this born orphan will feel compelled to ask, “This one of us, while as a small being lived, moved, and grew in the womb: did he eat and drink, and breathe with his mouth and his nostrils, and excrete?"

The answer will be, "No."

Undoubtedly, the orphan will then start throwing objections against that person’s statements, and raise proofs that all theses true facts are impossible, by bringing evidence from fully developed and stabilized beings. He will say:

·        Look, when any one of us is deprived of breath for a short time, he dies, and will no longer move. How then can we imagine that any one of us has been enclosed in a bag that is surrounded by a body for several months and remained alive and able to move? If any one of us would swallow a living bird, the bird would die immediately when it reached the stomach, much more so when it came to the lower part of the belly!

·        If we should not ingest food with our mouth or drink water, in a few days we should undoubtedly be dead! How then can a human being remain alive for months without taking food?

·        If any person would take food and would not be able to excrete it, in a short time he would die in great pain—how then can this man survive for months without excreting?!

·        If the there would be a perforation in the belly of any of us, he would die after a few days—how then can one think that the navel of the fetus has been open?!

·        How is it possible for the fetus not to open its eyes, spread out its hands and stretch out its legs if, as you think, the limbs are all whole and without defect?!

.

And so the entire extrapolation will draw him to the conclusion that it is absolutely impossible for man to be produced in the manner described.

Think deeply about this comparison and test it out, you the investigator, and you will find that this matches precisely our situation with Aristotle. For we, the community following in the footsteps of Moses and Abraham, believe that the world came into being in such-and-such a form, and became such-and-such from such-and-such (haya kach mi-kach ), and such was created after such. Aristotle comes to uproot our words, bringing proofs against us based upon the nature of how things are in their actualized, stabilized and fully developed existence. We ourselves admit to him that this is the nature of things after their having settled down and become fully developed; but we hold that these things in no way resemble themselves as they existed during their production; and we hold that these properties themselves [which existing things actually possessed during their production] had come into existence from absolute non-existence. What argument of anything they will  say can stand up against us?! They have demonstrative force only against those who hold that the nature of things as at present in existence proves [not only wise planning, but also] Creation ex nihilo. But this is not my opinion.

I will now go back and return to our theme, viz., to the description of the principal proofs of Aristotle, and show that they prove nothing whatever against us, since we hold that God (a) brought the entire Universe into existence from absolute non-existence, and that (b) He caused it to develop into the present state.

Aristotle says that the materia prima is eternal, and by referring to the properties of transient beings he attempts to prove this statement, and to show that the materia prima could not possibly have been produced. He is right; [but] we do not maintain that the materia prima has been produced in the same manner as man is produced from the ovum, and that it can be destroyed in the same manner as man is reduced to dust. [Rather,] we believe that God created it from nothing, and that since its creation it has its own properties, viz., that all things are produced of it and again reduced to it, when they cease to exist; that it does not exist without Form; and that it is the source of all genesis and destruction. Its genesis is not like that of the things produced from it, nor its destruction like theirs: for it has been created from nothing, and if it should please the Creator, He might reduce it to absolutely nothing.

The same applies to motion. Aristotle founds some of his proofs on the fact that motion is not subject to genesis or destruction. This is correct: if we consider motion as it exists at present, we cannot imagine that in its totality it should be subject, like individual motions, to genesis and destruction.

In like manner, Aristotle is correct in saying that circular motion is without beginning, in so far as seeing the rotating spherical body in actual existence, we cannot conceive the idea that that rotation has ever been absent.

The same argument we employ as regards the law that a state of potentiality precedes all actual genesis. This law applies to the Universe as it exists at present, when everything produced originates in another thing: but nothing perceived with our senses or comprehended in our mind can prove that a thing created from nothing must have been previously in a state of potentiality.

Again, as regards the theory that the heavens contain no opposites [in their elemental makeup, and are therefore indestructible], we admit its correctness: but we do not maintain that the production of the heavens has taken place in the same way as that of a horse or ass, and we do not say that they are like plants and animals, which are destructible on account of the opposite elements they contain. The main thing is, the nature of things when fully developed in no way show what had been the nature of those things before their completion.

W[e are following the majority opinion of the Sages who, disagreeing with both Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel, hold that the heavens and the earth were created simultaneously, as well as their components in potential form. But w]e also do not consider farfetched the statement of those [viz. Beis Shammai] who say that the heavens came into existence before the earth, or that the earth came into existence before the heavens [viz., Beis Hillel], or that the heavens have existed [since the first day of Creation] without stars [until the fourth day], or that certain species of creatures [such as the creatures of the waters and the skies] have been in existence since day five], and others [such as the land creatures] not [until day six]. For the state of the whole Universe when it came into existence may be compared with that of animals when their existence begins: the heart evidently precedes the testicles, the veins are in existence before the bones: although, when the animal is fully developed, none of the parts is missing which is essential to its existence.

If the Scriptural account of the Creation be taken at face value [that each day of Creation there was an independent creation ex nihilo, in immediate actual state, of each component of the world], all this explanation would also be necessary [and not only for showing why Aristotle’s arguments do not disprove Creation ex nihilo], even though the matter is not so [for actually—in accordance with the majority opinion of Chazal—everything was created in potential state instantaneously the first day, and only brought into actuality step-by-step each of the Creation days], as will be shown when we shall discuss [in II:30] this statement [by Chazal regarding the simultaneous creation ex nihilo of heaven and earth,].

You must strongly maintain this principle, for it is a high rampart that I have built around the Torah, surrounding it, making it able to resist the stones of all who shoot at it.

Aristotle, or rather his followers, may perhaps ask us how we know that the Universe has been created: and that other forces than those it has at present were acting in its Creation, since we hold that the properties of the Universe, as it exists at present, prove nothing as regards its creation. We reply, there is no necessity for this according to our plan; for we do not desire to prove the Creation, but only its possibility: and this possibility is not refuted by arguments based on the nature of the present Universe, which we do not dispute. Once we have established the admissibility of our theory, we shall show its superiority. In attempting to prove the inadmissibility of Creatio ex nihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore not derive any support from the nature of the Universe: they must resort to the notion our mind has formed of God. Their proofs include the three methods which I have mentioned above, and which are based on the notion conceived of God. In the next chapter I will expose the weak points of these arguments, and show that they really prove nothing.

תרגם לעברית, ביאר והכין על-פי כתבי-יד ודפוסים

מהדורת אינטרנט מעוצבת בידי יהודה איזנברג

חלק שני - פרק [יז]

[אין להשוות דבר קיים למצבו בעת התהוותו] כל מחודש שנהיה אחר שלא היה, ואפילו היה חומרו מצוי, ורק פשט צורה ולבש אחרת 1 - הרי טבעו אחר חידושו וגמרו ותנוחתו, 2 זולת [=שונה מ-] טבעו בעת התהוותו, כאשר החל לצאת מן הכוח אל הפועל, וגם זולת טבעו לפני שיתעורר לצאת אל הפועל 3. המשל בכך, כי טבע זרע האשה, כשהוא דם בכליו, זולת [=שונה מ-] טבעו בעת ההריון בעת מפגשו בזרע הזכר ותחילת תנועתו 4, וגם טבעו בעת זו, זולת טבע החי השלם אחר לידתו. ואין ללמוד בכל האופנים*4 מטבע הדבר אחר היותו וגמרו ומציאותו בתנוחתו כפי שלמות מצבו, על מצב אותו הדבר בעת תנועתו להוויה; ואין ללמוד ממצבו בעת תנועתו, על מצבו לפני שהחל בתנועה. וכל זמן שתטעה בעניין זה, ותביא ראיה5 מטבע הדבר המצוי בפועל על טבעו כשהוא בכוח, יתעוררו לך ספקות גדולים, ויהיו בטלים לדעתך דברים שהוויתם חיובית, ויתחייבו לדעתך דברים בטלים6. [משל - לידת האדם] והנה נניח במה שהמשלנו בו7, שאדם שלם מאוד באפיו הטבעי8, נולד, ומתה אמו אחר שהניקתו מספר חודשים. ובודדו גברים 9 בהשלמת גידול הילד הזה באי בודד, עד אשר גדל והשכיל ולמד. והוא לא ראה מעולם אשה, ולא נקבה מנקבות שאר בעלי החיים. ואז שאל ואמר לאיש מאשר עמו, היאך נמצאנו, ובאיזה אופן נהוינו? השיבו הנשאל, כי כל אחד ממנו נתהווה בבטן אחד ממיננו כמונו, והיא נקבה בצורת כך וכך, ושהאחד ממנו היה קטן הגוף בתוך הבטן, נע וניזון וגדל לאט, והוא חי, עד שיגיע לגבול מסוים בגודלו, ואז יפתח לו פתח בשיפולי הגוף, יגח 10 ממנו ויצא, ואינו חדל להתפתח אחרי כן עד שיהיה כפי שאתה רואה אותנו. הרי אותו הולד היתום 11 ישאל בהחלט ויאמר: ואותו האחד ממנו בעת שהיה קטן בבטן, והוא חי נע וגדל, האם היה אוכל ושותה ונושם מפיו ונחיריו ומוציא רעי? ואז יאמרו לו לאו! הרי בלי ספק ימהר להכחיש דבר זה, ויביא הוכחה על כל הדברים הללו האמיתיים שהם נמנעים במה שילמד מן המצוי השלם והיציב 12. ויאמר: כל אחד ממנו, אם תעצר ממנו הנשימה אפילו מקצת שעה, ימות ויבטלו 13 תנועותיו, והיאך יצטייר שיהא אחד ממנו בתוך כלי אטום המקיפו בתוך הגוף במשך חודשים והוא חי נע? - ואלו בלע אחד ממנו ציפור, היה אותו הציפור מת מיד בהגיעו לבטן 14, וכל שכן בבטן התחתון; - וכל אחד ממנו, אם לא יאכל המזון בפיו וישתה המים, יאבד בלי ספק במשך ימים מעטים, והיאך ישאר האדם חי חודשים ללא אכילה ושתיה?! - וכל אחד ממנו אם יאכל ולא יוציא רעי, הרי במשך ימים מעטים ימות בתחלואים קשים, והיאך יתקיים זה חודשים בלי שיוציא רעי? - ואלו ינקב בטן של אחד [קצט] ממנו, ימות אחרי איזה ימים, והיאך אתה חושב כי העובר הזה היה טבורו פתוח?! - והיאך לא יפתח עיניו ולא יפרוש כפיו ולא יפשוט רגליו, וכל אבריו בריאים אין פגע בהם כפי שאתם מדמים? ועל דרך זו ימשך לו כל ההיקש, שלא יתכן בשום אופן שהאדם יתהווה בצורה זו. התבונן נא במשל זה ובחנהו אתה המעיין, ואז תמצא כי זה בדיוק מצבנו עם אריסטו. שאנו ההולכים 15 אחרי משה רבנו ואברהם אבינו עליהם השלום, בדעה 16 שהעולם נתהווה באופן כך וכך, ונעשה כך מכך, ונברא בך אחר כך. ויבוא אריסטו לסתור דברינו, ולהביא לנו ראיה מטבע המציאות הנחה, השלמה המצויה בפועל, אשר אנחנו מודים לו שהיא אחר תנוחתה ושלמותה אינה דומה למאומה כמה שהייתה בעת ההתהוות, ושהיא נמצאת אחר ההעדר המוחלט. ואיזו ראיה 17 תתקיים נגדנו מכל מה שהוא אומר?! אבל יתקיימו אותן הראיות18 למי שטוען כי טבע המציאות הזו הנחה, מורה על היותו מחודש, וכבר הודעתיך כי אני איני טוען זאת, והנני חוזר ומזכיר לך יסודות דרכיו, ואראה לך היאך אין מחייב אותנו מהם מאומה, כיון שטענתנו שהעולם בכללותו המציאו ה' אחר ההעדר, והווהו עד אשר שלם כפי שאתה רואהו. [נגד אריסטו] אמר, כי החומר הראשון אינו הווה ולא נפסד, ובא להביא ראיה על כך 19 מן הדברים ההווים הנפסדים, ובאר מניעת התהוותו. וזה נכון, כי אנחנו לא טענו שהחומר הראשון נתהווה כהתהוות האדם מן הזרע, או יפסד כהפסד האדם אל העפר 20, אלא טענו כי ה' המציאו מן האין. והוא כפי שהוא אחר מציאותו, כלומר: שכל דבר מתהווה ממנו, ונפסד אליו כל מה שנתהווה ממנו, ולא ימצא מעורטל מצורה21, ועדיו מסתיימת ההוויה וההפסד. והוא אינו הווה כהתהוות מה שמתהווה ממנו, ולא נפסד כהפסד מה שנפסד אליו, אלא נוצר 22. וכאשר ירצה יוצרו - מעדירו העדר גמור ומוחלט. וכך בדומה אנו אומרים בתנועה, לפי שהוא הביא ראיה מטבע התנועה, שהיא לא הווה ולא נפסדת. והדבר נכון, לפי שאנו טוענים כי אחר מציאות התנועה כפי הטבע הזה אשר היא יציבה עליו, אין לשער הויתה והפסדה הוויה כללית והפסד כללי כהויית התנועות החלקיות ההוות, וכהפסד התנועות החלקיות. והוא הדין בכל מה שמחייב טבע התנועה. וכך הדבר בתנועה הסיבובית שאין לה התחילה23, הוא נכון אחר מציאות הגוף העיגול הנע בסיבוב לא יצטייר בתנועתו התחילה 24. וכך אנו אומרים באפשרות, שהוא מחייב שתקדם לכל הווה 25. שאין זה מתחייב אלא במציאות הזו היציבה, אשר כל מה שמתהווה בה מתהווה הוא ממצוי מסוים. אבל הדבר הנברא מן ההעדר, אין שם דבר שירמוז עליו לא בחוש ולא בשכל, שאז תקדם לו אפשרות. וכך אנו אומרים גם במה שהשמים אין בה נגדיות, 26 שזה נכון. פרט לכך שאנחנו [ר] לא טענו כי השמים נתהוו כהתהוות הסוס והדקל 27, ולא טענו שהרכבן מחייב להם הפסד כצומח וכחי מחמת הנגודים שבהם. קיצורו של דבר 28 הוא מה שאמרנו, שהמצוי במצב שלמותו וגמרו אין מצבו זה מורה על מצבו לפני שלמותו. וגם אין קושיא עלינו בדברי האומר כי השמים נתהוו לפני הארץ, או הארץ לפני השמים 29, או שהיו השמים ללא כוכבים 30, או מין חי בלעדי מין אחר 31, כי כל זה בעת התהוות הכללות הזו. כמו שהחי בעת התהוותו נתהווה בו הלב לפני האשכים, כפי שאנו רואים בעין, והעורקים לפני העצמות, ואף על פי שאחר שלמותו לא ימצא בו אבר בלעדי אבר מכל האברים אשר לא יתכן קיום האדם בלעדיהם. כל זה אנו נזקקים לו אם נקח את המקרא כפשוטו, ואף על פי שאין הדבר כך כמו שיתבאר בהמשך הדברים 32. ולכן ראוי שתשמר בעניין זה 33, כי הוא חומה בצורה בניתיו סביב התורה מקיף אותה, המונע אבני כל יורה אליה. [אנו מוכיחים אפשרות חידוש, ולא הכרח החידוש] ואם יטען 18 נגדנו אריסטו - כלומר: התופש השקפתו 34 - ויאמר, כיון שאין לנו למידות מן המציאות הזו, במה ידעתם אתם שזה נתהווה ושהיה שם טבע35 אחר הווה אותו 36. אמרנו אין זה מחייב אותנו לפי מחשבתנו, לפי שאין אנו רוצים עתה לבסס שהעולם מחודש. אלא כל מה שאנו רוצים, הוא אפשרות היותו מחודש, ושלא תבטל הנחה זו בלמידות בטבע המציאות אשר אין אנו מכחישים אותה. וכאשר תתבסס אפשרות ההנחה כמו שביארנו, נשוב אחר כן ונכריע השקפת החידוש. ולא ישאר בעניין זה אלא אם יביא 37 לנו מניעת חידוש העולם לא מצד טבע המציאות, אלא ממה שמחייב השכל ביחס לה', והם שלושת האופנים אשר כבר הזכרתים לך לעיל 38, ושהם לומדים בהם על קדמות העולם מצד ה'. והנני מגלה לך צדדי הפיקפוק בהם עד שלא תתקיים מהם ראיה כלל, בפרק הבא.

 

הערות: 1. כגון התהוות החי והצומח. 2. מצב שבו הוא נשאר לאחר גמרו. מצב קיומו השלימותי. 3. ובכך יש להבחין בכל דבר שלושה שלבים הללו אף בדבר שחומרו קיים. 4. התנועה כאן היא ההכללתית וכפי שקדם שכל שינוי תנועה הוא. וראה גם סוקראטס בספר תיאטיטוס של אפלטון מהד' רות עמ' 34 ועמ' 125. *4. לפי כ"י ב, בכל המציאות. 5. אפשר: ותחיל את הלמידות. או: ותמשיך ללמוד. 6. כלומר: שהתוצאה תהיה שדברים אפשריים יהיו לפי מסקנותיך ותוצאות עיונך נמנעים בלתי אפשרים. ולהיפך דברים הנמנעים יהיו לדעתך אפשריים. 7. לעיל, התהוות זרע האשה. 8. "כאמל אלפטרה" אפיו הטבעי ותכונותיו הנפשיות והשכליות בתכלית השלמות. ובר"ש "שלם במדע המוטבע באדם" וכביתר המקומות לא דק במילה זו. 9. "ואנפרד" כלומר: שנשאר טיפולו בידי גברים בלבד. ולפי כ"י ב, מ, "האיש" ואינו נכון, כי יש עוד גברים אחרים בכפר דכרייא זה וכמשמע לקמן. 10. "יברז" ובר"ש הושמט. וכדרכו להשמיט כל מה שנראה לו מיותר. 11. "אליתים" כשמילה זו נאמרת תוך שטף הדברים ללא צורך כי הלא מדובר ביתום. יש בה משום הקטנה מעין בטוי "המסכן", לרמוז שאינו מסוגל להבין דברים המובנים לאחרים. 12. הנח. הנמצא במצבו השלימותי. 13. אפשר: וישבתו 14. "אלמעדה" הבטן העליון. האסטומכא. 15. בר"ש "הרודפים". [קצט] 16. "נשתקד" כבר העירותי פעמים רבות, שאינה סתם אמונה. וכפי שבאר רבנו לעיל ח"א פרק נ. ורס"ג בהקדמתו לאמונות ודעות פ"ד ראה שם מהדורתי. ובר"ש "נאמין" ונתן מקום לנרבוני להשחיל את הזיותיו המפוקפקות בדברי רבנו. 17. "חג'ה" וראה לעיל פרק טו בע' 2. ואפשר לתרגם: ואיזו טענה תעמוד נגדנו. 18. אף כאן "חג'ה" וכדלעיל פ"ט הע' 2, 19. וכדלעיל בחלק זה פרק יד. 20. כלומר: דבר מדבר ודבר אל דבר. 21. כלומר: שחומר בלי צורה אינו מצוי כלל. ואינו ניתן לתפישה. ומה שאנחנו אומרים חומר וצורה אינה אלא הפשטה מחשבתית. או כלשון רבנו בהלכות יסודי התורה פ"ד הל' ז אלא לב האדם הוא שמחלק גוף הנמצא בדעתו ויודע שהוא מחובר מגולם וצורה. 22. אפשר: נברא. מחודש. 23. אין בה נקודת אחיזה מהיכן התחילה, ומזל טלה שאנו אומרים כי משם התחיל המחזור אינו אלא ציור דמיוני של קבוצת כוכבים. וראה בהלכות ברכות פ"י הל' יח. וקדוש החודש פ"י הל' ד. 24. לפירוש דברי אריסטו בעניין זה ראה לעיל פי"ג הע' 39. 25. וכדלעיל, הדרך הרביעי. 26. שם הדרך השלישי. 21. "אלנכ'לה" ובר"ש והחמור, ושמא ט"ס הוא [ר] וצ"ל והתמר. 28. "מלאך אלאמר" וכפי שתרגמתי, וכעין לשון רבנו בהלכות ברכות פ"י הל' ז. ובר"ש "ועקר העניין". 29. מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל בחגיגה יב א. 30. לפי פשטי הכתובים בבראשית א שהמאורות נבראו ברביעי. ועד אז היו השמים ללא כוכבים. 31. לפי פשטי הכתובים שם, שרץ המים והעוף בחמישי, וחית הארץ למינה בשישי. 32. לקמן פרק ל. 33. היסוד הגדול אשר הביא כאן רבנו, שאין ללמוד ולהקיש ממצב הדברים כפי שהם למה שהיה בהתהוות, אפילו בהתהוות יש מיש כיצירת העובר, וכל שכן יש מאין. 34. כי אריסטו הלא כבר מת. 35. נאמרה כאן המילה "טבע" כי המדובר הושם בפי אריסטו. 36. בר"ש "אחר הויתו" וטעות הוא. 37. אפשר: יוכיח. 38. פרק יד מחלק זה בשם תלמידי אריסטו וממשיכי דרכו.

 

Aveira Goreress Aveira

When this Blog was first initiated, I promised myself that I would stay away from anything personal. I adopted a whole list of "thou shalt and thou shalt nots". I resolved that I would not invoke the "K" word. I would not criticize Rabbi Slifkin personally. I would never discuss the issue of the ban. I would remain objective. I would remain calm. I would maintain decorum and communicate my message in a respectful tone. Tonight, I will probably break several of these resolutions if not all of them. The following Blog entry should be viewed as a personal protest of Rabbi Slifkin’s writings and as such constitutes a deviation from the standard operating procedures which define this site.

With his last two blogs regarding Rav Shlomo Miller shlita, Rabbi Slifkin has sunk to new lows. Unfortunately Chazal have already predicted such behavior when they stated: aveira goreress aveira.

Anyone who is even somewhat familiar with the writings of Rabbi Slifkin knows how cavalier he can be towards Chazal. His books contain numerous examples of how Chazal [supposedly] erred in a variety of different areas relating to nature. To be sure, he plies his trade with an affected air of respectfulness. But the bottom line is, his attitude towards the wisdom of Chazal is appalling. If anyone still nurtures any doubts, his latest monograph clearly reveals where his heart really lies. It is entirely dedicated to demonstrating a) Chazal’s primitive knowledge of cosmology and b) our license to reject Chazal’s statements on nature in other areas of science unrelated to cosmology.

The gedoley Yisrael have remonstrated with him regarding his erroneous attitudes towards Chazal and have even taken forceful action such as banning his books. But all this goes unheeded by the Rabbi. On the contrary, he continues to stridently defend his views in the face of overwhelming rabbinic opposition. Since Azariah de Rossi I cannot remember anyone who has devoted so much time effort and research into subjects that invariably culminate in Chazal’s [purported] shortcomings in science! Rabbi Slifkin’s attitude towards Chazal is, in my opinion, his primary indiscretion and is the one which directly facilitates the expression of his numerous other indiscretions. (Incidentally Rabbi Miller warned him about this in his letter of admonishment!)

Rabbi Slifkin writes as follows:

Rav Shlomo Miller, the senior Charedi rabbinic figure in Toronto, first became known to many people when he wrote a letter protesting the heresy of interpreting Maaseh Bereishis in naturalistic terms, specifically as done in my book The Challenge Of Creation (but also applicable to any way of reconciling Bereishis with modern science).

This assertion amounts to nothing more than arrogant presumption. Rav Shlomo Miller is a world renowned gaon and posek. He didn’t "first become known to many people" because he happened to write a macha’a against Rabbi Slifkin’s opinions. This obvious attempt at self-aggrandizement by association with a renowned talmid chacham is Rabbi Slifkin's first indiscretion.

Rabbi Slifkin continues:

Now, in contrast to the topic of organ donation, where I admitted that I had not researched the topic thoroughly, the topic of women covering their hair is a topic that I have not researched at all. But what do I see? I see that Rabbi Broyde wrote a lengthy, detailed, article, with copious footnotes. And I see that Rabbi Miller responded with a single paragraph of assertions from authority and insults. And I ask myself: When two people have a disagreement, and one calmly presents a thorough explanation of his position, while the other refuses to do so and simply hurls out angry insults, who is usually correct? When you have good reasons to be confident in the correctness of your position, you don't refrain from sharing them. That's why, without knowing anything at all about this topic, I see Rabbi Miller's condemnation of Rabbi Broyde's article as an endorsement of its arguments.

The only thing Rabbi Slifkin got right was his statement about himself: "without knowing anything at all about this topic". He goes on to write "I see Rabbi Miller's condemnation of Rabbi Broyde's article as an endorsement of its arguments" Actually Rabbi Slifkin sees nothing at all! All he "sees" are his biased views against Chazal which have now expressed themselves in biases against current talmeeday chachamim. Even a fool would be able to come up with the following line of reasoning. Rabbi Miller is a well-known posek. If he was writing a counter-teshuva to Rabbi Broyde’s presentation, does it even begin to make sense that he would write a tiny 5-10 line presentation? Hmmm…. Let me call the kollel in Toronto in an attempt to understand the nature of Rabbi Miller’s "psak"…

But no. Instead, Rabbi Slifkin aligns himself with the propaganda of an insignificant am ha’aretz in Chicago and a pompous, loud-mouthed lawyer in Toronto – both renowned mevazey talmeeday chachamim – and even has the temerity to echo their attitudes on his supposedly "Rationalist" Blog. There is nothing rational about your behavior Rabbi Slifkin. The aforementioned two individuals could possibly be excused due to ignorance but you are a Rabbi. There is no excuse for being mevazeh talmeeday chahcamim! I am sure you know what the Rambam paskens in Hilchos Teshuva regarding the fate of those who are mevazeh talmeeday chachamim; kal va’chomer when it is done in such a public manner!

At this time, it should be noted that at least as far as Rabbi Slifkin is concerned, Rabbi Miller should be held a notch above other gedoley yisrael. Rabbi Slifkin is always complaining about the fact that the gedoley Yisrael signed a ban against him without giving him an opportunity to defend himself. You can look high and low and you will not find Rav Miller amongst the signatories; not in the Israeli ones and not in the American ones. The only reason Rabbi Miller wrote what he did was because Rabbi Slifkin came here to Toronto to disseminate his ideas. Consequently certain people here approached Rabbi Miller and requested that he write a letter delineating precisely what the issues were with Rabbi Slifkin’s view.

Second of all, Rabbi Slifkin complains that the gedolim did not explain what was wrong with his views. Once again, Rav Miller cannot be accused of this. He explained precisely what was wrong. And in case people might not understand his meaning, his letter was translated into English with explanatory footnotes!

Third of all, Rabbi Slifkin protests the fact that the gedolim never bothered giving him an audience. Not so Rav Miller! When Rabbi Slifkin was in Toronto he was granted a personal audience in Rav Miller’s home. And despite the fact that Rabbi Slifkin was unable to convince Rav Miller of his views regarding ma’aseh bereishis, the meeting ended amicably as Rabbi Slifkin himself will attest to.

If Rabbi Slifkin does not wish to accept Rav Miller’s criticism, this can at least be understood if not countenanced. But in view of the above, it would behoove Rabbi Slifkin to at least dan Rav Miller l’kaf z’chus. Instead, he insinuates himself into the fray without any research whatsoever and hastily arrives at ridiculous and unwarranted conclusions! He should have heeded Mishlei’s injunction against "grasping the ears of a dog" but instead he chooses to become embroiled in a "riv lo lo" (see Mishlei 26:17) and ends up aligning himself with those who denigrate the honor of the Torah.

Rabbi Slifkin, you must repair the damage you have done. I know Rav Miller and I’m sure he is mochel you. In fact, I’m sure he never even bothered taking any of the smears against him seriously in the first place. But this has nothing to do with your personal obligation. You must publicly apologize to Rav Miller on exactly the same venue you chose to defame him. Otherwise, I fear that you will be throwing in your lot with all the rest of the leitzim and kofrim who choose to denigrate the honor of the Torah.

Now, for those who would actually like to get a few facts mixed into the story, here’s what really happened.

Rabbi Michael J. Broyde is a Professor of Law at Emory University of Law and a dayan on the RCA Beis Din. Rabbi Broyde’s views can generally be characterized as leftist and people in the know have told me that even in the RCA he is a bit of a renegade. In 2008, he wrote a long teshuva which was characterized by him as "an attempt to justify the halakhic practice of the daughters of Israel who otherwise [other than uncovering their hair in public] dress and act modestly". Presumably this would apply both to past and present women. Rabbi E.B. Shulman responded to Rabbi Broyde and the latter presented his counter response ending with the following statement "I am convinced that it is the proper understanding of the Tur, Shulchan Aruch and Levush, as well as a smattering of Rishonim and Acharonim"

Recently, a certain Rabbi approached Rabbi Miller and complained that he was having trouble with Rabbi Broyde’s teshuva. I don’t know the exact details at this time but I strongly suspect that said Rabbi was experiencing some trouble with his constituency due to Rabbi Broyde’s teshuva. [Note: Rabbi Broyde claims that, in his opinion, the Tur and Shulchan Aruch would permit Jewish women to go out in public with their hair uncovered providing many (or perhaps most) Jewish woman do not currently cover their hair.]

In order to effectively address the issues associated with Rabbi Broyde’s teshuva, the above-noted Rabbi requested from Rabbi Miller that he should write a short "psak" regarding Rabbi Broyde’s teshuva in the most forceful way possible. If his constituency could be convinced that there was no merit to Rabbi Broyde’s approach, the issue could finally be laid to rest. After due consideration, Rabbi Miller decided to accede to his request. Rabbi Miller’s hand-written note was not a teshuva. It was not a response to Rabbi Broyde. It was his way of accommodating a personal request from a local Rabbi! It was not published anywhere and was never meant for public consumption. As these things go however, Rav Miller’s "psak", or more accurately, his macha’a, managed to find itself in the hands of unscrupulous individuals who decided to disseminate it over the net, misrepresent the background, and indulge in egregious bizayon hatorah! That’s the whole story, from beginning to end!

Rabbi Slifkin, does this story really warrant a post on your site, much less two posts? Is your site about the explication of the rationalist approach to Judaism or is it about gedolim bashing? I think you need to take a step backwards and begin examining your motives…

Backtracking

Rabbi Slifkin responded to my post, Not-So-Solid Proof About The Spheres. Because my response to this entails much special formatting that is tedious to insert in the Comments section, and because I feel the subject is so important, I’m transplanting the discussion to a blog post.

Rabbi Slifkin wrote, responding to my point that the sources show that despite his claims, it is very uncertain that the ancients entertained a belief that the “spheres” by which they described the stars movements were solid entities:

It's not entirely clear how to define the medieval view -but it is largely irrelevant. My point was NOT that Chazal, or Rambam, held the spheres to be solid in the scientific sense of solid as opposed to liquid or gas.

I see. You were not using the word “solid” in the “scientific” sense…

Rabbi Slifkin, I’m afraid you’re backtracking. In the very post to which you are replying, I included your mention of “the question of how we would penetrate the solid crystalline sphere in order to get [past them]!” You have repeatedly stated many times and emphasized the claim that Chazal unanimously held that the rakia is a solid dome And you meant solid, as opposed to liquid and gas, and as opposed to unknown ethereal substance, and as opposed to gravitational or other force fields..

You have done this because

a. the rakia is an object mentioned in the pesukim, and

b. by convincing your readers that there was a mesorah about it, and that the mesorah was that it is a solid dome,

c. you led them to believe that we are forced to say a mesorah can be wrong; and

d. therefore there is license for you to dismiss—in favor of the evolutionary natural process paradigm—the mesorah attributing to the Creation process a fundamentally meta-natural character, including the creation of Adam sans biological ancestors

At least, this is how your readership who commented on this blog understood you. Step two, establishing (falsely) that there is a mesorah that the rakia is solid, is essential to your thesis.

Are you now retracting?

Rather, it was that the sphere is something with substance i.e. it is not the atmosphere, or outer space.

The atmosphere does not have substance?? Outer space cannot have substance that would have been described as a non earthly-type of substance that is colorless and weightless, accordingly lacking any mass (basically making the theory un-falsifiable, and perhaps therefore unscientific, but by no means proven false)??

The point is that, as Chazal make clear in Pesachim, the sun moves on both sides of it surface and it is opaque such that the sun cannot be seen when it is behind it.

The opinion of the Chachmei Yisrael in Pesachim is one opinion among others in Chazal. Our girsa in the Gemora—as some understand it—has Rebbi supporting the gentiles’ model. Rebbi is also part of Chazal. Rav Yehudah [bar Ilai] in Chagigah 12b holds that the sun, moon and stars are all embedded in the 2^nd  of seven rakias—which differs with the description of the sun independently boring through the rakia of the stars and traveling anywhere not within it. R. Shimon bar Yochai (Breishis Rabbah 1:8) disagreed with the entire model of spheres, and declared one cannot know how to explain the stars’ movements.

So how do you justify your claim about what “Chazal” make clear about the opaqueness of the rakia?

And in fact, the opinion of the Chachmei Yisroel in Pesachim itself is very difficult to understand internally. I would like to understand, for instance, how the Chachmei Yisroel accounted for seeing the moon at night, when its visibility is dependent upon the sun’s influence on it—even according to the ancient Babylonians—if the sun at night is blocked by an opaque rakia.

You have a lot to learn to understand the all the talmudic and midrashic passages, both internally and how they interreact, before you can build your case that—despite the vast Torah literature that makes it clear that the mesorah is that the Creation process was a meta-natural one—you have the license to reject that mesorah. And even if you declare that you feel it is more likely to find a way to mix and match sources in a way that results in disagreeing with the mesorah, you are choosing an iconoclastic approach that is in opposition to the behavior of Torah scholarship throughout the millennia that strove instead to defend it.

Moreover, Chazal in the Yerushalmi certainly held it to be "firm" in some sense.

Need I elaborate on the senses in which “firm” can be taken, without it meaning that it is literally a solid, especially when used in reference to the atmosphere—as the Rambam explicitly understands it? (And, by the way, there you went again intimating the idea that you just backed away from, that the rakia was understood to be a solid object…”in the scientific sense.”)

And for the life of me I can't figure out why you're claiming that I'm proving what Chazal held about the rakia from the writings of a 6th century monk.

I’m claiming it because you wrote:

As we shall later demonstrate from both general history as well as the

interpretations of the Geonim and Rishonim, the view of the Sages of Israel was that

of ancient Babylonian cosmology. They believed that the earth is a roughly flat disc,

and the rest of the universe is a hemispherical solid dome fixed above it. The stars

move around the surface of this dome; hence, “the [hemi]sphere is fixed and the

constellations revolve [within it].”

“The rest of the universe,” besides the earth, “is a hemispherical solid dome fixed above it” refers to the rakia, or the spheres, or shamayim, no? You set out to prove that, no?

There are those who doubt whether the dispute between the Sages of Israel and the sages of the nations was as we have described it. However, if we look at the very next lines of the Talmud, we will be able to show that this is clearly the case.

“as we have described it”—the “it” is that, for one thing, “the rest of the universe is a hemispherical solid dome,” no? “we will be able to show that this is clearly the case”—“this” being the “it,” being that “the rest of the universe [besides the earth] is a hemispheric solid dome,” no? And the next of the Talmud shows that “this is clearly the case” because, why?--

This is because it [the Talmud] presents a set of arguments which we find elsewhere…

Where’s “elsewhere”? You explain:

The Sages of Israel say, During the day, the sun travels below the firmament, and at

night, above the firmament. Cosmas Indicopleustes [the 6-th century monk] uses the same terminology as the Talmud…

Since the identical arguments are used, we can see that the Jewish and gentile sages were indeed involved in the dispute between the ancient Babylonian cosmology and the newer Ptolemaic model. The Talmud immediately continues to relate another difference of opinion between the Jewish and gentile scholars: The Sages of Israel say, During the day, the sun travels below the firmament, and at night, above the firmament….This is a corollary of the first dispute. Consistent with the ancient Babylonian cosmology, the Jewish Sages believed that…

So the fact that a 6^th-century monk (who was plausibly familiar with the talmudic passage in question) took it and interpreted its arguments a certain way (or, otherwise, came up with them on his own), is the “elsewhere” from which know that “it is clearly the case” that “the dispute between the Sages of Israel and the gentile sages were indeed involved in the dispute between the ancient Babylonian cosmology and the newer Ptolemaic model,” and that Chazal “believed that the rest of the universe [besides the earth] was a hemispherical solid dome.”

So how do you now claim that “for the life of me I can't figure out why you're claiming that I'm proving what Chazal held about the rakia from the writings of a 6th century monk”?

and in I only quoted him with regard to some particular aspects of that discussion. And incidentally, Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam and others explain those aspects in exactly the same way.

Okay, so exactly what aspects are you deducing, and what aspects are you not deducing, from the 6^th-century monk, Chazal’s beliefs about the rakia? And if Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam and others explain the same aspects to you were referring, in exactly the same way the 6^th-century monk did, why did you resort to the Christian monk’s opinion as proof to what the Talmud means, rather to that of the rishonim? Because he lived earlier? Because the monk was less biased than Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam and others when it comes to understanding the true meaning of Chazal’s words?

But the fact of Chazal believing the rakia to be an opaque, substantive dome is the UNIVERSAL view of the Rishonim.

This may be the first sentence you’ve written that does not put the word “solid” near the words “rakia” and “dome.” Congratulations on finally retracting! Regardless, I already explained why your claim is wrong. And, as I will explain, is largely irrelevant.

It's odd that you are ignoring the big issue - Chazal's view of the rakia - and instead talking about Rambam's view of the rakia, which is not particularly relevant

It is very relevant because it demonstrates the falseness of your mantra that the spheres were thought of as solid objects, which until now you saw cause to constantly repeat. The Rambam upheld the model of the spheres, yet he distinctly describes them as not being solid. And as I’ve shown, many Greek philosophers as well did not think they were solid. And I doubt you have evidence that the Babylonians thought they were literally solid.

Wikipedia, “Ancient Mesopotamian Astronomy”

Crude Celestial Concepts

(Source: S. Toulmin and J. Goodfield. The Fabric of the Heavens)

In any case, to be honest, we do not know for certain whether the [Babylonian] astronomers had any theoretical ideas about the heavenly bodies or not. All we can say is that their practical achievements did not require any theoretical insight, and that scarcely a trace has survived of any theories they may have had. One of the rare pieces of evidence, and a very indirect one at that, is contained in the following passage from Vitruvius…  At first sight this may seem to discredit our generalization about Babylonian astronomy—namely, that it was purely computational, and that theoretical speculation played a negligible part.  On closer examination, however, the passage rather seems to bear out rather than to falsify this claim

Yet you write with such confidence that “the view of the Sages of Israel was that of ancient Babylonian cosmology. They believed that the earth is a roughly flat disc, and the rest of the universe is a hemispherical solid dome fixed above it.

This is the big issue because you’ve built your case on the claim that there was a mesorah that the rakia is an opaque solid, and since we know this isn’t so, you see that the mesorah is not reliable, and therefore you have license to dismiss as well the mesorah that Creation was a not a natural, but a meta-natural process.

But you are right that the solidity or non-solidity the Chochmei Yisrael attributed to the spheres is ultimately not so relevant. Indeed, even your false claim that Chazal unanimously attributed opaqueness to the rakia is irrelevant.

Because your next mistake is that you invoke the Rambam’s et al shitta--that when it comes to astronomy, etc., Chazal may have been wrong—for license to dismiss the mesorah of the meta-natural creation process, when that very shitta makes a clear and fundamental distinction between matters known through mesorah and matters such as the substance of the spheres and the movements of the stars.

But the fact is that the Rambam et al, and all Torah scholarship throughout the millennia, do not countenance disagreeing with a matter recognized as the mesorah. This is clear to anyone who studies the millennia of Torah literature with an unbiased and un-agenda-inspired attitude. If the Rambam et al thought that talmudic statements about astronomy were meant to be taken at their surface meaning as part of the mesorah they would never countenance disagreeing with it. The Rambam et al held that the rakia’s makeup, and the path the sun takes at night, is not a matter of mesorah. And the Rambam himself admitted that he really felt it beyond his ability to know for certain what in the world the causes of the heavenly bodies’ motions or what their makeup are—because there is no mesorah about that.

מורה נבוכים ב:כב

ואמנם כל מה שבשמים לא ידע האדם דבר ממנו אלא בזה השעור הלמודי המעט, ואתה תראה מה שבו. ואני אומר ע״צ מליצת השיר, "השמים שמים לה׳ והארץ נתן לבני אדם," ר״ל שהשם לבדו ידע אמתת השמים וטבעם, ועצמם, וצורתם, ותנועותם, וסבותם על השלמות, אמנם מה שתחת השמים נתן יכולת לאדם לדעתו, מפני שהוא עולמו וביתו אשר ירד בו והוא חלק ממנו וזהו האמת, כי סבות הראיה על השמים נמנעות אצלנו, כבר רחקו ממנו ונעלו במקום ובמעלה. והראיה הכוללת מהם שהם הורונו על מניעם, אבל שאר ענינם הוא ענין לא יניעו שכלי האדם לידיעתו, והטריח המחשבות במה שלא יניעו להשגתו ואין כלי להם שיגיעו בו, אמנם הוא חסמן דעת או מין מהשגעון, אבל נעמוד אצל היכלת ונניח הענין כמה שלא יושג בהקש, למי שבאהו השפע האלהי העצום עד שיהיה ראוי שנאמר עליו פה אל פה אדבר בו, זה תכלית מה שאצלי בזאת השאלה, ואפשר שיהיה אצל זולתי מופת יתבאר לו בו אמתת מה שסופק אצלי, ותכלית בחירתי לאמת שאני בארתי בלבולי אלו הענינים, ואני לא שמעתי מופת על דבר מהם ולא ידעתיו

MN 2:24

What I said before (2:22) I will repeat now, namely, that the theory of Aristotle, in explaining the phenomena in the sublunary world, is in accordance with logical inference. Here we know the causal relationship between one phenomenon and another; we see how far science can investigate them, and the management of nature is clear and intelligible.

But of the things in the heavens man knows nothing except a few mathematical calculations, and you see how far these go. I say in the words of the poet," The heavens are the Lord's, but the earth He hath given to the sons of man" (Ps. cxv. 16): that is to say, God alone has a perfect and true knowledge of the heavens, their nature, their essence, their form, their motions, and their causes; but He gave man power to know the things which are under the heavens: here is man's world, here is his home, into which he has been placed, and of which he is himself a portion. This is in reality the truth. For the facts which we require in proving [anything about] the existence of heavenly entities are withheld from us: the heavens are too far from us, and too exalted in place and rank. Man's faculties are too deficient to comprehend even the general proof the heavens contain for the existence of Him who sets them in motion.

So, the Rambam does not only say that the mechanics of the stars’ movements—something not specified in the pesukim of Maasei Breishis—is something for which there is no extant mesorah (—and by the way, the Rambam was not the first to declare this: Rav Saadia Gaon said this as well—); he also says that we do not really know what causes the stars to move—despite his tentatively following Aristotle in attributing this to some spheres--and that we do not really know the composition (nature, essence, form) of the heavenly bodies—despite his confident description of the same.

By the way, I am still waiting for you to retract your baseless charge that I depicted the rakia in a cartoonish manner in order to ridicule Chazal. Which was especially ironic in light of your cartoonish depiction of Chazal themselves on the cover of your book.

I already addressed this in the comments section to another post, but b”n I will address it on this one again in a separate comment.

Peshat and Derash

In his last two posts, Rabbi Slifkin bemoans the propensity of people to frequently conflate Derash (biblical exegesis) with Peshat (plain meaning of the verse). Something was gnawing away at the back of my mind but I just couldn’t put my finger on it. I was about to let these two posts slide when it hit me; there are two things which trouble me with his posts. The first will, please G-d, be dealt with in this blog entry and the next in the following one.

The Rabbi writes:

As my friend Professor Eric Lawee has demonstrated in a recent fascinating article, "Words Unfitly Spoken: Late Medieval Criticism of the Role of Midrash in Rashi’s Commentary on the Torah," in Between Rashi and Maimonides: Themes in Medieval Jewish Law, Thought and Culture, Rashi's commentary did not initially receive the universal reverence that it has today. A number of Rishonim and early Acharonim were highly critical of Rashi for frequently giving a peshat that they considered to be derash rather than peshat.

This characterization of Rashi is disturbing. Eric is a sincere, highly intelligent fellow. I always learn something when I read his stuff (quick – can anyone tell me what an Andalusian polymath is?). But for Rabbi Slifkin to state that "a number of Rishonim and early Acharonim were highly critical of Rashi" is not a fair statement. To be sure, Professor Lawee does provide a few such examples but a) they must be taken within context, and b) they are not abundant as Rabbi Slifkin’s statement implies (a number of Rishonim and Acharonim).

Furthermore, I think Rabbi Slifkin is missing a fundamental element of Rashi’s methodology. Rashi himself describes his own mandate. He writes (my translation in the colloquial) as follows:

"As for me; I have not endeavored but to interpret the verses based on their plain meaning or based on aggadic interpretations which establish the meaning of the verses as a word spoken properly" (Bereishis 3:8)

It is clear from Rashi that there are two types of aggada. One which does not sit well with the plain meaning of the verses and one which actually assists in the proper comprehension of the plain meaning. Rashi typically quotes the latter, not the former. It is part of his mandate. As far as why Rashi bothers to quote two possible plain-meaning interpretations when the second one relies on rabbinical derash will be addressed in the following post.

The Rakia - Part 1

About a month ago, Rabbi Slifkin released his monograph entitled ‘The Sun’s Path at Night’. It deals with obscure and outdated models of cosmology and how they interface with the cosmological models adopted by our sages. It is based on an essay Rabbi Slifkin composed as part of the course requirements for an MA in Jewish Studies. Normally such a paper would not generate much interest outside the sphere of academia but in this case it is of special interest to the authors of this blog. Rabbi Slifkin’s monograph (as opposed to his essay) was animated by a desire to demonstrate that Chazal can, and should be understood as having erred in matters of science. This is clear from the very outset. In his introduction he writes as follows:

"The clash between reason and authority has many manifestations. But it comes to the fore with the issue of statements by the Sages of the Talmud concerning the natural world that are subsequently contradicted by science…Dealing with an aspect of cosmology that is outdated and obscure from a modern perspective, most students of the Talmud today gloss over it with little comprehension; indeed, the very word "cosmology" (which refers to the structure of the universe) is unfamiliar to many people. Yet when clarified, and the views of rabbinic scholars throughout the centuries on this passage are surveyed, it powerfully illustrates the radical transformation that has taken place over the ages with regard to how Jews view the Sages of the Talmud."

A proper analysis of Rabbi Slifkin’s paper is beyond the scope of this venue. However, in keeping with the mandate of this blog, something should be said regarding his paper. Today I finally downloaded the paper and read it. Knowing in advance what Rabbi Slifkin’s mandate was, I will freely admit that I went in with a healthy measure of skepticism. However, much to my surprise his presentation began to tickle my fancy! It was apparent that he had done significant research and his methodology seemed genuinely objective. As such, I have chosen to focus this blog entry on one thing, and one thing alone. Rabbi Slifkin’s personal view of the gemara in Pesachim 94b as developed in the first five pages of his monograph (pp 4-8).

While it remains true that the real issue at hand is his attitude towards Chazal, it is imperative that we first analyze Rabbi Slifkin’s view of the gemara in Pesachim in an attempt to determine precisely what Chazal are saying there. After all, before this gemara can be used as a justification for rejecting the science of Chazal, we first must understand what Chazal are saying. Towards this end, I intend on listing five questions on his pshat in the gemara. Rabbi Slifkin’s approach is truly intriguing and shows some real promise. As such, I am genuinely interested in discovering if it can be adopted. But as it stands now, I feel his pshat is untenable; here’s why.

Introduction

Before listing our questions, I would like to synopsize Rabbi Slifkin’s view for the benefit of our readers. Rabbi Slifkin maintains that the view of the "sages of Israel" is aligned with the Babylonian model of cosmology, to wit, that "the earth is a roughly flat disc, and the rest of the universe is a hemispherical solid dome fixed above it. The stars move around the surface of this dome; hence, "the [hemi]sphere is fixed and the constellations revolve [within it]."

The view of the gentile sages is aligned with the Ptolemaic model that "the earth is a perfect sphere, and the rest of the universe is a larger sphere which encompasses it and revolves around it. The stars are permanently embedded in the surface of the larger sphere, and move along with it; hence, "the sphere revolves and the constellations are fixed."

Based on the similarities of an argument found in our sugya and a polemic found in the writings of one Cosmas Indicopleustes of Alexandria, a sixth century Christian monk, Rabbi Slifkin concludes that his description of the machlokes in the gemara is clearly correct. Although his assertion can be challenged, in keeping with the stated purpose of this post we will grant Rabbi Slifkin this claim. Here are the questions.

1) In the initial dispute between the chachmei Yisrael (CY) and the chachmei umos (CU), Rebbi attempts to defend the CY by stating as follows: "Rebbi said: A response to their words is that we have never found the Great Bear constellation in the south and the Scorpion constellation in the north."

If, as Rabbi Slifkin contends, the opinion of the CY is that the constellations move freely around within the dome, how does Rebbi’s question support his own model over that of the CU?

2) In the second dispute found in the gemara, Rebbi concedes that the CU (i.e. the Ptolemaic model) seem to be correct because "during the day the wellsprings are cool and at night they steam (due to being heated by the sun passing beneath them—Rashi)." But if the earth is a perfect sphere, this argument is absurd. The sun is passing under another part of the earth, not under the springs!

3) This next question is a bit complicated. Rabbi Slifkin’s thesis is based on the assertion that the CY are aligned with a Babylonian cosmology, defined by Rabbi Slifkin as the earth being "roughly [a] flat disc" while the universe is "a hemispherical solid dome fixed above it." As Rabbi Slifkin explains:

"Consistent with the ancient Babylonian cosmology, the Jewish Sages believed that when the sun sets, it cannot continue downwards, and it must instead change direction. First it enters the firmament horizontally, and then after passing through the firmament, it changes direction again, rising up to pass behind the firmament back to the east."

Based on our current understanding, the position that ‘nighttime’ is engendered by the sun ducking behind a solid dome is obviously problematic and that’s fine. But here’s the problem. On page 6, Rabbi Slifkin quotes a gemara in Bava Basra (25a-b) which discusses a dispute between R’ Eliezer and R’ Yehoshua. In his glosses to this dispute, Maharsha comments that R’ Yehoshua follows the CU. Rabbi Slifkin takes issue with Maharsha’s comment and instead explains R’ Yeshoshua as follows:

"R. Yehoshua is not saying that the sun passes below the earth at night, in a circular route; rather, he is of the view that the sun moves horizontally along the northern edge of the celestial dome. This is consistent with how others present the view of the Babylonian cosmology. Severianus, Bishop of Gabala (d. 408), wrote that the earth is flat and the sun does not pass under it in the night, but travels through the northern parts "as if hidden by a wall."

"Horizontally along the northern edge of the celestial dome"? What’s this? The Babylonian model is a solid firmament and the sun ducks outside of the dome through a window low in the firmament in the northwest region, travels in an upward arc outside the dome, and then descends to the southeast region and reenters the solid dome through a window and reinitiates its daily travel!! What’s up with this horizontal travel pattern? And what’s up with this "northern edge of the celestial dome"? Isn’t it supposed to be outside the dome?

Regarding this latter question, one might be tempted to respond that the "northern edge" refers to the edge outside of the dome but Rabbi Slifkin makes it clear that this is not so. In support of his description, he once again quotes our friend the Christian monk as follows:

"…the sun issuing from the east traverses the sky in the south and ascends northwards, and becomes visible to the whole of the inhabited world. But as the northern and western summit intervenes it produces night in the ocean beyond this earth of ours, and also in the earth beyond the ocean; then afterwards when the sun is in the west, where he is hidden by the highest portion of the earth, and runs his course over the ocean through the northern parts, his presence there makes it night for us, until in describing his orbit he comes again to the east, and again ascending the southern sky illumines the inhabited world…"

Well then. It seems clear from this description that the reason the sun is not seen by the "inhabited world" is because it travels to the extreme northern region of the "uninhabited" world and ducks down low behind "high portions of the earth" thus creating nighttime for the inhabited part of the world. It travels horizontally along this northern edge all the way back to the east and reappears again in the east when it begins to rise up above these "high portions". No solid firmament here! No windows in the sky! What’s going on??

I think it seems clear that Rabbi Slifkin’s "Babylonian" descriptions are contradictory. He needs to work out precisely what the Babylonian paradigm was before imputing it to Chazal!

Truth to tell, I made a list of 13 questions on Rabbi Slifkin’s pshat to Pesachim 94b (i.e. just from pages 4-8). I figured I would be able to outline at least five of them but I see that this post is way too long already so I will leave it at three questions, for now.

The Nature of “The” Rakia, Part Eight—A Superior Understanding of Pesachim 94

 

 As promised, I shall deal with the passage in Pesachim 94b that describes the sun as travelling behind the rakia at night.

Now, it is of course true that the unidentified “Chachmei Yisroel” of Gemora Pesachim 94b (taken literally) posit that at night, when we do not see the sun, the sun travels “behind the rakia.” And one would reasonably intuit that this indicates they thought the reason we do not see the sun at night is that the rakia (or rather, the back layer of the rakia) is opaque.

But the following question arises: Must we say that this passage shows that Chazal thought of the celestial-rakia as opaque, rendering it at odds with

(a) the Midrash we cited about Avraham Avinu viewing the stars from the back of the rakia, and

(b) the fact likely recognized by Chazal, and certainly by rishonim, that the sun lights the moon?

My answer: Not at all! I will propose, with support from the text, another explanation for how the Gemora Pesachim understands why, at night, when the sun is above the rakia, it cannot be seen.

We note the following:

(a) The Pesachim 94b passage about the path of the sun behind the rakia does not actually say that our inability to see the sun at night is due to any intrinsic opacity[1] or solidity of the celestial rakia

(b) Indeed, no talmudic passage, including this one, actually says that the celestial rakia is either solid or intrinsically opaque.

(c) The expression “עובי הרקיע,” usually translated “thickness of the rakia,” does not in itself inform on the rakia’s texture or transparency. Both the Rambam[2] and the Ralbag[3] also speak of the “עובי” or “עבי” of the spheres, yet they describe the spheres as being ethereal, weightless and colorless. The term “עובי הרקיע” simply refers to the depth—the distance—the rakia spans, whatever texture or substance it may have.[4]

(d) Thus the only feature the Gemora Pesachim 94b does ascribe to the rakia is vast depth.

(e) The preceding Gemara passage describes each of the thousands of the stars we see as specks in the sky to actually be many times the size of earth.

I humbly suggest on this basis that Pesachim 94a is working with the observable fact that distance diminishes the apparent size of objects, to the extent of their ultimate disappearance from sight. This is why those stars, each thousands of times the size of earth, appear to us as mere specks. Now, if the sun travels above the entire vast area of stars, even beyond those stars so far away they can barely be seen, this would account for, and indeed necessitate, that the sun at night must be so far away that it should be impossible to see it at all. We cannot see the sun at night, when it’s behind the rakia, because it is so distant, not because of any opaqueness. The transparent character of the entire celestial rakia, as described by the rishonim, remains intact.

This would fully explain how Chazal could have visualized Avraham seeing the stars from behind the most distant celestial sphere, whereas we cannot see the sun that is behind the dome at night. This would assume there are more stars we cannot see that are further from the earth, as the Gemara implies. (Absence of a filtering atmosphere in space would also contribute to better visibility, but this is not spoken of in the Talmud.)

And this would also explain how the sun’s rays, coming from one side of the rakia, could be seen as illuminating the otherwise dark moon, at an angle at which it would be lit in phases by the sun’s rays. (I am speculating that the moon at night does not join the sun behind the dome.[5]

I venture to call this a superior explanation of the passage in Pesachim, because this explanation uses only the very components and features that Gemora passage (together with its contextual surroundings) itself explicitly mentions, without introducing extraneous and speculative factors and components (such as solidity and opaqueness) that, as we have shown, contradict other talmudic and midrashic sources[6] (—although it still remains at odds with the shita that the sun at night travels beneath the earth).

And this would eliminate a machlokess between Chazal, with them all agreeing that the substance within which the stars are located does not have an opaque back.

All the above is following the basic understanding that the Gemora Pesachim 94b is indeed speaking about the daily path of the sun’s body. This is indeed how Rabbeynu Chananel, referencing a “Braissa D’Rabbeynu Shmuel,”[7] takes it.[8] I am also working on another altogether different possibility. ב”נ I will post it in the future if it turns out to be good enough for presentation.

---

[1] I say “intrinsically,” because the sky, one of the suggested definitions of rakia, turns opaque colors—blue, gray, orange and red due to the action of the sun’s rays upon it. This, despite the fact that the atmosphere itself is intrinsically transparent. When Chazal say the sky is the color of the sea, it is no more indicative of intrinsic opaqueness than it is indicative of opaqueness when we say the sky is blue.

[2] Rambam, Moreh Nevuchim 3:14 speaks of עבי הגלגל, and treats it synonymously with the word for “distance”:

(ונם כן היותי שומע תמיד מכל מי שידע דבר מחכמת התבונה, שהוא חושב לגוזמא מה שזכרוהו החכמים ז"ל מן הרחקים, שהם אמרו שעובי כל גלגל מהלך ת"ק שנה , ובין כל גלגל וגלגל מהלך ת״ק שנה)

--and indeed, in Moreh Nevuchim 1:57, he describes the spheres as consisting of non-earthly, indescribable material:   “[N]otwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we can obtain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens—a revolving substance which has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and examined even as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each other and respecting most of their motions—although we know that they must consist of matter and form; but since the matter is unlike sublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms expressing negative properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities. Thus we say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, not passive and therefore not subject to impressions, and that they do not possess the sensations of taste and smell: or we use similar negative attributes. All this we do, because we do not know their substance.”

Likewise, in Mishneh Torah Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 3:3 he describes the galgalim as weightless, tasteless, and lacking any aroma, since such properties only exist in the sublunar world.

[3] Ralbag in his Breishis commentary refers to the rakia’s thickness as a fact in the name of Chazal yet simultaneously describes the rakia as weightless and transparent.

[4] Also relevant:

מדרש רבה דברים פרשה ב

... (ד"ה ב לג) “ויתפלל אליו [מנשה] ויעתר לו ויחתר לו." מלמד שהיו מלאכי השרת מסתמין את חלונות של רקיע שלא תעלה תפלתו לשמים. מה עשה הקב"ה? חתר את הרקיע מתחת כסא הכבוד וקיבל את תפלתו וישיבהו ירושלים למלכותו ...

Chazal here speak of the “windows” of the rakia, and the “piercing of the heavens,” in an obviously poetical, non-physical way.)

[5] This speculation must also be made in the approach that the reason the sun cannot be seen at night is that the rakia’s back layer is opaque—which does not solve the problem pointed out, that this would prevent the moon from being lit by the sun.

[7] The Sefer Hashavas Aveida identifies this braissa with Pirkei D’Rebbi Eliezer.

[8] Rabbeynu Chananel on Pesachim 94a

ופירש רבינו שמואל בברייתא שלו כי הרקיע עשוי ככובא, הגלגל קבוע והמזלוח חוזרין,
ותניא כדבעינן למימר קמן, כי החמה מהלכת בלילה למעלה מן הרקיע מן המערב למזרח, וכשמגעת לחלון שזורחת ממנו, לאלתר עולה עמוד השחר, והחמה מהלכת בעוביו של רקיע, וכשתגיע לסוף עביו של רקיע לצד הנראה לבני אדם, מיד מנצח על הארץ ומהלכת ביום כולו ממזרח למערב. וכן בשקיעות, מהלכת בעביו של רקיע, וכשתצא מעובי הרקיע כולו--מיד הכוכבים נראין.

Not-So-Solid Proof About The Spheres

Referring to my pointing out that the Rambam does not refer to the spheres as solid material, and on the contrary, described them as consisting of something similar to, but not identical to, water…[yet] consisting of a weightless, colorless, unearthly matter (perhaps what we would call some sort of force field?). Rabbi Slifkin, on his blog, wrote:

He also misunderstands the nature of the spheres that Rambam describes, due to his lack of knowledge of Greek philosophy and Ptolemaic astronomy. They are certainly not "force fields"!

Look: Something has to be the cause of the planets’ motions. Either the planets are self-locomotive, or there is an external force that moves them—be it a centrifugal force, a gravitational force, a magnetic force or whatever. The ancients described the force as a belt or sphere pushing the planets as they do; and they described these forces as being non-earthly, ethereal, of elemental water or elemental fire. In our parlance, this would be called a force field, and we differ with the ancients over exactly what the forces are. But if one wants to make the ancient theory look all the more primitive, he will insist that it depicted the universe as consisting of solid, impenetrable spheres. He will make it sound like “crystalline” means not only transparent, but also “made of crystal.”

So why is Rabbi Slifkin so certain that Chazal (not to mention the mesorah) thought that the spheres to which were referring to were impenetrably solid objects? Here is his “solid” proof:

since in the ancient world everyone believed that the sky is solid, there is no question that when each of the Sages received their Torah education from their parents and teachers, they were taught that the rakia is a solid firmament - as were their parents and teachers in turn.

How convincing! (I’m not sure whether this ranks with his proof about what the Sages held about the rakia--from the writings of a 6^th century monk.)

But in the little I have learned about what Greek philosophy claimed about spheres, I recall that it is not so clear that it held them to be solids. I would like to quote some sources that shed light on this subject:

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) taught that the ether was a fifth element that carried the stars and planets embedded in it. Plato (428–348 B.C.E.) and the Stoics regarded it as a fluid and the source of life. In antiquity, the substance of the heaven was known as ether, although there was no general agreement on its nature or extent. When Arisototle adopted Eudoxus of Cnidus’s construction to explain the planetary motion, he began a tradition that treated the substance of the heavens as a series of shells surrounding a central earth. He regarded the substance of these shells as a fifth element, distinct from the four terrestrial elements and possessing a natural tendency to move at uniform speed in a circle. The stars and the planets (including the Sun and the Moon) did not move freely. They were merely denser parts of one particular shell, and their motions were the result of the rotation of that shell and the rotation of other shells to which it was attached at its axes. …The ether spheres of both Aristotle and Ptolemy were in immediate contact and excluded vacua. …In contrast to Aristotle’s inanimate but naturally rotating ether, Plato had taught that the heavens were filled with life-giving fire….

--Encyclopedia of the scientific revolution: from Copernicus to Newton, by Wilbur Applebaum, Garland Publishing, Inc. (Taylor & Francis Group), p. 335.

(WILBUR APPLEBAUM is Professor Emeritus, Department of Humanities, Illinois Institute of Technology, where he taught history of science for many years. He has published on various aspects of the Scientific Revolution and on astronomy in the 17th century. He is the editor of the Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution [2000].)

So, according to this source, Plato considered the invisible spheres to consist of the element of fire and fluid (reminiscent of אש ומים), whereas his disciple Aristotle (whose astronomical depictions the Rambam generally endorsed) considered it to be ether. Rabbi Slifkin should be aware that ether was not considered an impenetrable solid. It is, in fact, ethereal.

Another source:

It should be explained, however, that, with both Hipparchus and Ptolemy, the theory of epicycles would appear to have been held rather as a working hypothesis than as a certainty, so far as the actuality of the minor spheres or epicycles is concerned. That is to say, these astronomers probably did not conceive either the epicycles or the greater spheres as constituting actual solid substances. Subsequent generations, however, put this interpretation upon the theory, conceiving the various spheres as actual crystalline bodies.

--A History of Science, by Henry Smith Williams, M.D., LL.D., Vol I, Harper and Brothers, 1904.

To reiterate: According to this source, even considering the spheres “solid crystalline bodies” (yet ethereal?) spheres proposed by Ptolemy was only the invention of later generations. Ptolemy himself “probably” did not conceive them as actual solid substances at all.

Indeed,

At the time of the Greek philosophers…[t]he reality of the spheres was open to debate. Some thought of the spheres as nothing more than mathematical ideas that described motion in the world model, while others began to think of the spheres as real objects made of perfect celestial material. Aristotle, for example, seems to have thought of the spheres as real.

--The Solar System, by Michael A. Seeds, sixth edition, Thomson, Brooks/Cole, 2008, p.56

(Michael A. Seeds wrote Horizons: Exploring the Universe, an astronomy textbook. Currently in its 11th edition, and is used in some colleges as a guide book for astronomy introduction classes. It covers all major ideas in astronomy, from the apparent magnitude scale, to the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation, to gamma ray bursts.)

In case it seems a bit confusing as to what kind of substance the ancients actually thought the spheres consisted of, Edward Grant, in Planets, Stars and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1787 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), clarifies for us on page 324,

it is unclear what substance the ancients attributed to the spheres.

(Edward Grant (born April 6, 1926) is Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University, Bloomington. Before arriving at Indiana University in the fall of 1959, Professor Grant taught at the University of Maine and in the history of science program at Harvard University. Professor Grant was twice chair of his department (1973–1979; 1987–1990) where he taught courses on medieval science, natural philosophy and science and religion. Edward Grant was named a Distinguished Professor in 1983. He has received many other honors and awards, including the George Sarton Medal in 1992, the most prestigious award given by the History of Science Society that "recognizes those whose entire careers have been devoted to the field and whose scholarship is exceptional." He has published more than ninety articles and twelve books, including:

· Physical Science in the Middle Ages (1971);

· Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution (1981);

· Planets, Stars, & Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1687 (1994);

· The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages (1996);

· God and Reason in the Middle Ages (2001);

· Science and Religion From Aristotle to Copernicus 400 BC — AD 1550 (2004);

· A History of Natural Philosophy from the Ancient World to the Nineteenth Century (2007).

***

There is some background to this issue of Rabbi Slifkin insisting that the proposed spheres of ancient astronomers/philosophers were unquestionably solid..

On the Hirhurim blog a few months ago, I had commented on a mention that Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky zt”l observed that when he saw the telecast of Neil Armstrong walking on the moon, it disproved the Rambam’s position that the moon is not a physical body.

I don’t understand how this whole issue arises. The Rambam does not say that the moon is a non-physical body upon which a man could not walk. On the contrary, he contrasts the moon and all the heavenly bodies to angels in the aspect that—unlike angels—they do possess physical form, just as humans do. His only point is that they are not dead and inanimate physical bodies—they are life-forms, with instinctive drives. I fail to grasp Rav Kaminetzky’s kushya on the Rambam.

רמב"ם הלכות יסודי התורה פרק ב הלכה ג

כל מה שברא הקב"ה בעולמו נחלק לשלשה חלקים. מהן ברואים שהן מחוברים מגולם וצורה, והם הווים ונפסדים תמיד--כמו גופות האדם והבהמה והצמחים והמתכות. ומהן ברואים שהן מחוברין מגולם וצורה, אבל אינן משתנין מגוף לגוף ומצורה לצורה כמו הראשונים, אלא צורתן קבועה לעולם בגולמם ואינן משתנין כמו אלו--והם הגלגלים והכוכבים שבהן. ואין גולמם כשאר גולמים ולא צורתם כשאר צורות. ומהן ברואים צורה בלא גולם כלל והם המלאכים שהמלאכים אינם גוף וגויה אלא צורות נפרדות זו מזו:

Everything HaKadosh Baruch Hu created in His world can be divided into three categories. Some are things created composed of material and form, constantly decaying—such as the bodies of man and beast and agricultural produce and metals. And some things are created composed of material and form, but do not change like the former—and these are the heavenly spheres and the stars within them. But the material they are made of is not like the material of the other material things. And some of the things created are form without material at all—and those are the angels. For the angles are not [composed of] body and bulk, but [non-material] forms independent of each other.

Someone else added that the fact space ships went to the moon and further without hitting into or being slowed down by anything shows that there are no spheres. To this I responded,

the Rambam does not say the bodies of the spheres are bodies so solid that they would perceptively slow down rockets or would make an impact on them or vice versa. What he says indicates otherwise:

רמב”ם הלכות יסודי התורה פרק ג הלכה ג

כל הגלגלים אינן לא קלים ולא כבדים ואין להם לא עין אדום ולא עין שחור ולא שאר עינות וזה שאנו רואין אותם כעין התכלת למראית העין בלבד הוא לפי גובה האויר וכן אין להם לא טעם ולא ריח לפי שאין אלו המאורעין מצויין אלא בגופות שלמטה מהן:

They are colorless and tasteless, neither lightweight nor heavy. One might describe them as living forcefields with intuitive motivation

RNS wrote in saying that of course the spheres are solid, since the planets are embedded in them!

Natan Slifkin on September 7, 2010 at 2:50 pm

What do you think the spheres are made of? They are certainly solid, as the stars and planets are embedded within them!

And where do you think that Rambam got the idea of spheres from? It was standard Ptolemaic cosmology. Learn up about it, and you will understand what they thought the spheres are.

He also wrote:

Rambam clearly subscribed to the Aristotelian view that the moon is. And that’s not just a matter of the molecules it is made of; it’s a description of how the whole domain is something else entirely, which material bodies cannot exist in. This quite aside from the question of how we would penetrate the solid crystalline sphere in order to get there! He discusses his view of the cosmos in several places in the Guide, but to understand it, you have to understand the Aristotelian view of the universe.

To this I replied:

A field of force—say, magnetic, or gravitational—need not be impenetrably solid to have some objects “imbedded” in it while allowing others to pass without an impression being made on either. It is true that the Rambam followed the opinion that both the moon and the spheres are made of a fifth element of an ethereal nature unlike anything on our earth. But please point out where the Almagest or other such work writes that whereas the spheres are so solid as to be impenetrable, the moon is so ethereal that it would be impossible for man to walk upon it. Then we can mull over how a solid impenetrable substance in which the gigantic stars are imbedded can be weightless; and then we can try to explain how man’s walking on the moon disproves that it is a living, thinking thing. ..

Despite my prodding (and alluding to information he is lacking or ignoring) Rabbi Slifkin never supplied such a source. Yet he continues to confidently state that it is due to my lack of knowledge of Greek philosophy and Ptolemaic astronomy that I could deny that the Rambam held that the spheres are of solid, impenetrable material.

The sources I cited above indicate that his case is not very solid.